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1. FRAGMENTS OF HISTORY 
The political and intellectual relationship of the French and 
American peoples during the late eighteenth century has been 
described by one writer as ranking among the "great international 
flirtations of history."! But as much as that is the case,2 it is also 
true that like the passions of many an erstwhile beau, America's 
memory of the affair has faded. If asked about the French Rev-
olution-an event which in its time was of such awesome mag-
nitude as to command not only American attention,3 but to force 
much of Europe to choose sides4-it is likely that most American 
lawyers could today recall only a few fragmentary facts. 
I Bruun, The Constitutional Cult in the Ear(v Nineteenth Century, in THE CONSTITUTION 
RECONSIDERED 261 (c. Read ed. 1938). 
2 According to Lord Acton, "Nothing is more certain than that American principles 
profoundly influenced France and determined the course of the [French] revolution 
.... " Ault, The American Constitution and the Liberal Movement in America, England, and 
France, in THE BACON LECTURES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 293 (1939). 
See generally J. MOORE, THE ROOTS OF FRENCH REPUBLICANISM 64-113 (l934) (discussing 
the influence of American republicanism on French thought). 
3 See L. KAPLAN, JEFFERSON AND FRANCE: AN ESSAY ON POLITICS AND POLITICAL IDEAS 
40 (1967) ("The Revolution ... captured the imagination of the American people in 1790 
and 1791 as it became identified for them with America's own glorious days of a few 
years back."), 41 (the principal issue was the "flaming comet of the French Revolution"), 
55 (crowds cheered Citizen Genet as he traveled from Charlestown to Philadelphia in 
1793, and express[ed] ... appreciation [for] France's gallant fight for the common cause 
of liberty); L. GERSHOY, THE ERA OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 1789-1799: TEN YEARS 
THAT SHOOK THE WORLD 49 (1957) [hereinafter TEN YEARS] ("News of the upheaval in 
France spread to the outside world, crossing the mountains and the rivers of the European 
continent, leaping across the Channel, spanning the broad Atlantic"), 54 (in America, 
there was at first almost universal enthusiasm; "Debates on the issues at home blended 
with the defense or condemnation of the revolution abroad"); D. MALONE, JEFFERSON AND 
THE RIGHTS OF MAN 404 (1951) (listing prominent American supporters and opponents 
of the first French Constitution). 
4 France declared war against a number of nations which rose to the defense of the 
embattled French monarchy. See generally J. BOSHER, THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 159-68 
(1988) (discussing war with Austria), 183 (discussing war with Great Britain, the Dutch 
Republic, and Spain); see also TEN YEARS, supra note 3, at 50 ("from Holland to northern 
Italy, the news was heatedly received and vigorously discussed"), ("German intellectuals 
... exulted over the first news from Paris"), 51-53 ("Englishmen hailed the destruction 
of the Bastille," but "Edmund Burke soon sounded the conservative alarm ... [in his] 
Reflections on the Revolution in France," and later "[p]atriotic mobs attacked the dangerous 
admirers of the French"); J. BOSHER, supra at 183 (execution of the king "stirred up deep 
hostility abroad"); cf Berman, Law and Belief in Three Revolutions, 18 VAL. U.L. REV. 569, 
615 (l984) ("there was the constant threat that the royalists would regain power, backed 
by ... various foreign powers"). But see TEN YEARS, supra note 3, at 49 ("backwardness 
kept the news out of northern, southern, and eastern Europe"). 
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Attorneys might dimly remember, perhaps, that the revolution 
in France occurred shortly after the one in America;5 that it was 
marred by extreme violence;6 and that despite important French 
support for the earlier American struggle with Britain,7 the 
United States remained largely neutral as French revolutionaries 
battled the monarchies of Europe at home and abroad. 8 A few 
might even recall, from the deep recesses of memory, a charter 
impressively titled The Declaration of the Rights of Man and of 
Citizens (Declaration of Rights).9 But only the rare American 
lawyer would be able to say anything of its content, not to mention 
its role in galvanizing opinion on both sides of the Atlantic. 
This is not surprising. Persons ranging from Justice John Paul 
Stevens lO to Professor AUan Bloom ll remind us that knowledge 
5 Lord Cornwallis surrendered at Yorktown on October 19, 1781, and the Treaty of 
Paris between the United States and England was signed on September 3, 1783. R. 
HOFSTADTER, W. MILLER, AND D. AARON, THE UNITED STATES: THE HISTORY OF A REPUB-
LIC 109 (l957). The French Revolution commenced in mid-1789, with the revolt of Paris. 
See A. MATHIEZ, THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 40 (c. Phillips trans. 1922). 
6 See generally C. MOFFETT, THE REIGN OF TERROR IN THE FRENCH REVOLUTION (1962). 
7 See, e.g., R. CLARK, BENJAMIN FRANKLIN: A BIOGRAPHY 8 (desperately needed arms), 
313 (l983) (reference to "program of aid"); J. MOORE, supra note 2, at 70-71 (secret 
grants of money followed by official recognition of the independence of the United States); 
C. VAN DOREN, BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 593-95 (discussing treaty of alliance and commerce), 
578-79 (discussing assistance from Lafayette) (l938). 
8 See generally P. GAXOTTE, THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 173-204 (W. Phillips trans. 1932) 
(discussing war and monarchs); A. MATHIEZ, supra note 5, at 133-62, 275-88 (discussing 
the overthrow of the French monarchy and war with foreign nations); cf L. KAPLAN, 
supra note 3, at 57. 
9 DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND OF CITIZENS, in T. PAINE, THE RIGHTS OF 
MAN 94-97 (1951) [hereinafter DECLARATION OF MAN]. See generally G. JELLINEK, THE 
DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND OF CITIZENS (M. Farrand trans. 1979). 
10 Justice Stevens recently suggested that although "law and economics" and "law and 
literature" are currently fashionable topics in interdisciplinary legal studies, there is a 
need for greater attention to the relationship between law and history. See Address by 
Justice J.P. Stevens, Thomas E. Fairchild Inaugural Lecture at the University of Wisconsin 
(Sept. 9, 1988) (available from the Public Information Office of the Supreme Court of 
the United States) [hereinafter Fairchild Lecture]. In criticizing the incomplete use of 
history in the majority opinion in Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (l984), the "nativity 
scene case," Justice Stevens stated: 
A judge'S use of history must involve more than a search for isolated items of 
information. A historical inquiry has both a horizontal and a vertical dimension. 
The isolated fact must be studied in its contemporary setting, as well as in relation 
to what may have preceded or followed. For history, like the law and life itself, 
involves a process of change, of growth, and of improvement. 
Fairchild Lecture, supra at 20 (footnote omitted). 
II A. BLOOM, THE CLOSING OF THE AMERICAN MIND (1987). In his recent best seller, 
Professor Bloom wrote: 
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of history--our own or that of others-is not an American 
strength, and the charge distressingly rings true. But even aside 
from this it is a matter of jurisprudential fact that the legal paths 
of the two nations have measurably diverged during the inter-
vening two centuries. In the pursuit of social order and justice, 
the precedent-based American common law tradition has dif-
fered in important respects from the codified civil law tradition 
of France. 12 Like our language, our legal system, since its earliest 
days, has developed chiefly from the British side of the Channel. 13 
This lineage has influenced many aspects of our legal culture, 
including our perception of which major documents we may 
legitimately claim as juridical ancestors-or at least acknowledge 
as respectable relatives. More than a little telling is the fact that 
while the opinions of the United States Supreme Court frequently 
venerate the English Magna Carta, the Declaration of Rights has 
never been cited in the U.S. Reports, not even for comparative 
purposes. 14 
[T]he unity, grandeUl" and attendant folklore of the founding heritage was 
attacked from so many directions in the last half-century that it gradually dis-
appeared from daily life and textbooks .... 
. . . Students now arrive at the university ignorant and cynical about our 
political heritage. lacking the wherewithal to be either inspired by it or seriously 
critical of it. 
... [N]obody believes that the old books do, or even could, contain the truth. 
Id. at 55-58. 
12 See generally M. GU:NI>ON, M. GORI>ON, ANI> C. OSAKWE, COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRA-
I>ITIONS: TEXT, MATERIALS ANI> CASf:S ON THE CIVIL LAW, COMMON LAW, AND SOCIALIST 
LAW TRAI>lTlONS WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO FRENCH, WEST GERMAN, ENGLISH, AND 
SOVlt:T LAW 68, 73, 152-54, 589-92, 598-608 (1985) [hereinafter COMPARATIVE LEGAL 
TRAI>lTlONS] (discussing differences in the role of the judiciary, review of legislation for 
constitutionality, the structure of the legal profession, treatment of precedent, and pat-
terns of legal reasoning). 
13 See L. WRIGHT, MAGNA CARTA AND THE TRAI>lTlON OF LIBERTY 5 (1976) (a preface 
by former Chief Justice Burger states, "[t]he Due Process concept embraced in OUl" 
Constitution traces directly back nearly 600 years to Runnymede."), 9 ("The colonists 
looked back to a legacy from Magna Carta as their basic inheritance of freedom and 
justice .... Always there was recourse to the authority of Magna Carta .... "). 
14 A search on WESTLAW in September, 1988, revealed that while the United States 
Supreme Court has never cited the Declaration of Rights of Man, the Magna Carta has 
grown in popularity. Although the latter was cited only foUl" times between 1790 and 
1944, it has been referred to by the Court on forty-three occasions since 1945. Similarly, 
while the Magna Carta has been cited hundreds of times by state and lower federal COUl"ts, 
the Declaration of Rights has been mentioned on only a handful of occasions. 
As part of the celebration of our first 200 years as a nation, the American Revolution 
Bicentennial Administration published a book commemorating the "Magna Carta and 
the Tradition of Liberty." See supra note 13. 
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Recently, Americans have been engaged in an effort to 
properly commemorate the bicentennial of the U.S. Constitution 
(1787) and Bill of Rights (1791).15 If one is serious about that 
endeavor, it may be profitable to focus on the other bicentennial 
being celebrated this year in France. The early days of the French 
and American republics were intertwined, and it would be erro-
neous to think that the developments which then took place in 
the two countries can now fully be understood in isolation. The 
tale of the role of the French courts during the Reign of Terror 
which occurred shortly after the enactment of the Declaration of 
Rights holds important lessons for those who are concerned with 
the implementation of American constitutional provisions declar-
ing basic civil rights. 
A fertile topic for scholars,16 much of the literature on the 
French Revolution is so entangled with the intricacies of French 
and Continental politics, or freighted with the baggage of ideo-
logical perspective, as to render it all but inaccessible to the in-
terested nonspecialist. The reader, unable to confidently differ-
entiate the Montagnards, the Girondins, the Hebertists, and the 
sans-coulottes, or Danton, Marat, Robespierre, and Brissot,17 stands 
l5 The Constitutional Convention approved the proposed Constitution on September 
17, 1787. Scudiere, "In Order to Form a More Perfect Union": The United States. 1774-1791, 
in THE CONSTITUTION AND THE STATES: THE ROLE OF THE ORIGINAL THIRTEEN IN THE 
FRAMING AND ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, 13 (P. Conley &J. Kaminski eds. 
1988). The first ten amendments were proposed in 1789 and added to the Constitution 
on December 15, 1791. when the eleventh state, Virginia, ratified the Bill of Rights. Id. 
at 20. 
16 J. BOSHER, supra note 4; BRUUN, supra note I; P. GAXOTTE, supra note 8; A. MATHIEZ, 
supra note 5; C. MOFFETT, supra note 6; and TEN YEARS, supra note 3. See generally G. 
ANDREWS, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE EARLY FRENCH REVOLUTION (B. Schmitt ed. 1972); 
H. BELLOC, THE FRENCH REVOLUTION (1911); C. BRINTON, A DECADE OF REVOLUTION, 
1789-1799 (1934); 1. GERSHOY, THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 1789-1799 (1932); C. HAZEN, 
THE FRENCH REVOLUTION (1932) (two volumes); D. JOHNSON, THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 
(1970); A. LOOMIS, PARIS IN THE TERROR (1964); R. PALMER, TWELVE WHO RULED: THE 
COMMITTEE OF PUBLIC SAFETY DURING THE TERROR (1941); M. SLAVIN, THE FRENCH 
REVOLUTION IN MINIATURE: SECTION DROITS-DE-L'HoMME, 1789-1795 (1984); R. SOBEL, 
THE FRENCH REVOLUTION: A CONCISE HISTORY AND INTERPRETATION (1967); J. Brissaud, 
History of French Public Law, in THE CONSTITUTION RECONSIDERED (C. Read ed. 1938); 
Godfrey, Revolutionary justice: A Study of the Organization, Personnel, and Procedure of the 
Paris Tribunal 1793-95, in 33 THE JAMES SPRUNT STUDIES IN HISTORY AND POLITICAL 
SCIENCE (A. Newsome, W. Pierson, M. Garrett, F. Green, K. Fraser eds. 1951); see also 
Ault, supra note 2. 
Annotated bibliographies of literature on the French Revolution are set forth in J. 
BOSHER, supra note 4, at 292-95; C. MOFFETT, supra note 6, at 186-89. 
17 A comprehensive "Who's Who in the French Revolution" is provided in J. BOSHER, 
supra note 4, at xxiii-Ixi. 
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little chance of grasping other than the most obvious aspects of 
the dramatic legal transformations which took place under the 
succession of short-lived constitutions adopted by the French. ls 
Much of the story of the French court system during the revo-
lutionary era can be found only in fragmentary references scat-
tered throughout diverse sources. 
This article will consider a number of the legal aspects of the 
French Revolution especially relevant to the American experi-
ence. Among these are the terms of the Declaration of Rights; 
the American contributions toward its enactment; the failure of 
the French to enforce the Declaration's guarantees through an 
independent judiciary; and the abuses of legal procedure and 
governmental power which occurred during the Reign of Terror. 
II. THE DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND OF CITIZENS 
A. Similarity to the American Constitution and Bill of Rights 
Drafted and enacted in the early days of the French Revolu-
tion,19 within weeks of the fall of the Bastille,20 the Declaration 
of Rights is a document which, then and now, most Americans 
could easily understand and probably embrace. In terms strik-
ingly similar to those found in the U.S. Constitution and its 
amendments, the Declaration of Rights defines the rights of in-
dividuals vis-a-vis the state.21 Addressing such fundamental con-
cerns as free expression, rights of the accused, due process, and 
state taking of private property, it delineates for individuals a 
generous range of personal rights and freedoms. 
18 Ten different constitutions were adopted by the French between 1789 and 1815. 
Berman, supra note 4, at 615; see also J. BRISSAUD, A HISTORY OF FRENCH PUBLIC LAW 
545 (1915) [hereinafter FRENCH PUBLIC LAW] (four constitutions between 1791 and 1800). 
'9 The enactment of a bill of rights was proposed to the French National Assembly by 
the Marquis de Lafayette on July 11, 1789. See G. ANDREWS, supra note 16, at 13; G. 
JELLINEK, supra note 9, at 14. Following the appointment of a committee to consider 
various drafts, and discussions in the Assembly, the Declaration of the Rights of Man and 
of Citizens (Declaration of Rights) was passed on August 26, 1789. See G. ANDREWS, supra 
note 16, 19-20; G. JELLINEK, supra note 9, at 1. Interestingly, Bosher notes that, "[i]n the 
many preliminary drafts and debates this Assembly of 'country attorneys and obscure 
curates,' as Burke called them, indulged in so much repetition of their own abstractions 
that they bored each other and began to stay away from the sessions." J. BOSHER, supra 
note 4, at 137. The Declaration of Rights was approved by the King during the month 
following its passage. [d. 
20 The Bastille fell on July 14, 1789. See generally H. BELLOC, supra note 16, at 100. 
2' See infra notes 22-34 and accompanying text. 
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The Declaration of Rights provides that subject to responsibility 
for abuse and disturbance of the public order, "every citizen may 
speak, write, and publish freely,"22 and may hold "religious opin-
ions."23 Persons may not be accused of a crime, arrested, or 
confined, "except in cases determined by the law, and according 
to the forms it has prescribed."24 "Arbitrary" action by state of-
ficials is forbidden 25 and detention may not be accomplished by 
the use of excessive force. 26 A person accused of a crime is "pre-
sumed innocent [until] ... convicted,"27 and may be punished 
only to the extent "necessary" to accomplish the objectives of the 
law,28 and only pursuant to a law "promulgated before the of-
fense."29 No person may be "compelled to [do] that which the law 
does not require."30 Takings of property by the state are condi-
tioned upon 'just indemnity."3! Taxation without representation 
is condemned.32 Equality of persons is recognized by language 
22 DECLARATION OF MAN, supra note 9, at art. XI. Compare with U.S. CONST. amend. I 
("Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press .... "). 
23 DECLARATION OF MAN, supra note 9, at art. X. Compare with U.S. CONST. amend. I 
("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the 
free exercise thereof .... "). 
24 DECLARATION OF MAN, supra note 9, at art. VII. Compare with U.S. CONST. amend. V 
("No person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime, unless on 
a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury ... nor deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law."), amend. XIV ("[N]or shall any State deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... "). See also U.S. CONST. at art. I, 
§ 9 ("The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in 
Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it."). 
25 DECLARATION OF MAN supra note 9, at art. VII. Due process of law, which proscribes 
arbitrary treatment, is guaranteed by the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the U.S. 
Constitution. U.S. CONST. amend. V, XIV. 
26 DECLARATION OF MAN supra note 9, at art. IX. Compare with U.S. CONST. amend. VIII 
("Excessive bail shall not be required .... "). 
27 DECLARATION OF MAN supra note 9, at art. IX. Compare In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 
361-63 (l970) (stating that the due process clause of the U.S. Constitution requires proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt of criminal charges and that that "standard provides concrete 
substance for the presumption of innocence"); see also Coffin v. United States, 15 S. Ct. 
394,403-05 (1895) (discussing history of presumption of innocence). 
28 DECLARATION OF MAN supra note 9, at art. VIII. Compare with U.S. CONST. amend. 
VIII ("excessive fines [shall not be] imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments in-
flicted"). 
29 DECLARATION OF MAN supra note 9, at art. VIII. Compare with U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9 
("No ... ex post facto Law shall be passed .... "), art. I, sec. 10 ("No State shall ... pass 
any ... ex post facto Law .... "). 
30 DECLARATION OF MAN supra note 9, at art. V. 
31 DECLARATION OF MAN supra note 9, at art. XVII. Compare with U.S. CONST. amend. V 
(,,[P]rivate property [shall not be] taken for public use without just compensation"). 
32 DECLARATION OF MAN supra note 9, at art. XIV; see also id. at art. XIII. Compare with 
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 15 (U.S. 1776), (condemniDg the King of Great 
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providing that "[m]en are born, and always continue, free and 
equal in respect of their rights,"3:~ and that "whether [a law] 
protects or punishes ... [all citizens are] equal in its sight."34 
B. American Antecedents and Influences 
So similar35 are the guarantees in the Declaration of Rights to 
those contained in the American Constitution and Bill of Rights, 
that it would be astonishing if the two were not related. While 
these documents both draw inspiration from the Enlightenment 
philosophers,36 they are in fact more directly linked,37 though 
not in the same manner that one might first expect. 
The individual rights articulated in the Declaration of Rights 
were not based on the original text of the U.S. Constitution, for 
as American states protested during the ratification process, the 
Constitution initially lacked a bill of rights encompassing such 
guarantees. 3H The French provisions were also not predicated 
Britain "[Ilor imposing Taxes on us without our Consent"). As events developed in France, 
only a select few would prove to be fully entitled to representation. Under the constitution 
of 1791: 
[A] distinction was drawn between "active" and "passive" citizens. All adult males 
were citizens, but only those who paid in direct taxes the equivalent of three days 
work, annually, were active citizens with the right of voting. There was an even 
higher property qualification for those who could sit in the national parliament. 
D. JOHNSON, supra note 16, at 47. 
" DECLARATION OF MAN supra note 9, at art. I. Compare with DECLARATION OF INDEPEN-
DENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) ("We hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are 
created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, 
that among these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness .... "). 
34 DECLARATION OF MAN supra note 9, at art. VI. Compare with U.S. CONST. amend XIV 
("No State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws, ... "). The federal government is required to provide equal protection by the due 
process clause of the fifth amendment. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499-500 
(\ 954), 
M There ate, to be sure, important differences between the Declaration of Rights and 
its Ameritatl counterparts. For example, the Declaration of Rights did not include rights 
of petitiotl, assembly, or association. See generally TEN YEARS, supra note 3, at 37 (discus8ing 
cotltents of the Declaration of Rights and explaining that by what it omitted, as well as 
what it underscored, the Declaration of Rights "was most realistically attuned to the 
historic experiences of living Frenchmen ... [and] designed for French needs") . 
• 6 See BERMAN, supra note 4, at 616 (French revolution had its origin in the European 
Enlightenment); see generally F. McDONALD, Novus ORDO SECLORUM 57-96 (1985) (dis-
cussing influence of Locke, Montesquieu, and others on the American founding). 
37 Cf TEN YEARS, supra note 3, at 37 (Declaration of Rights drew "heavily" upon English 
and American ideas). 
38 See Scudiere, supra note 15, at 20 ("Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Virginia, and 
New York, for example, specifically demanded a bill of rights, and other states ratified 
the Constitution based on a promise that it would be amended to protect individual 
liberties. "). 
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upon any final version of the American Bill of Rights, for those 
first ten amendments were not ratified until after the issuance of 
the Declaration of Rights.39 
Rather, the roots of both the Declaration of Rights and the 
American Bill of Rights can be traced to provisions in various 
American state constitutions which had been adopted by the for-
mer colonies following America's break with Britain.40 These state 
bills of rights influenced the Americans who called for the addi-
tion of a bill of rights to the U.S. Constitution in the late 1780s,41 
and they were the subject of considerable discussion in France. 
As early as 1778, at least seven American state constitutions had 
been translated into French and distributed in France.42 Some of 
these documents-the first written constitutions in the world-
reached Paris within weeks of their adoption.43 
Benjamin Franklin, the American ambassador in Paris from 
1776 to 1784, played an important part in the process of pro-
moting the American vision of the proper role of government.44 
Recognized in France as the preeminent American in science, 
letters, and international prestige,45 Franklin's views were avidly 
sought and willingly received by the influential, the ambitious, 
and, in fact, the merely curious.46 Taking advantage of his pop-
39 Whether the Declaration of Rights was inspired by a preliminary copy of the American 
Bill of Rights circulated prior to its final ratification by the states is unclear. Moore states, 
"[o)n one of the walls of his Parisian residence, [Lafayette, a leading proponent of the 
Declaration of Rights) had the American Bill of Rights handsomely framed. Immediately 
contiguous was a space which he said was to be for the Declaration of Rights." J. MOORE, 
supra note 2, at 91-92. Moore does not indicate that this occurred prior to the adoption 
of the Declaration of Rights in August 1789. 
One source suggests exercise of influence was just the reverse-that the u.s. Bill of 
Rights was added to the original Constitution "on the inspiration" of the Declaration of 
Rights. C. FRIEDRICH, THE IMPACT OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM ABROAD 73 (1967). 
40 See generally Kenyon, Constitutionalism in Revolutionary America, in CONSTITUTIONALISM: 
NOMOS XX 90 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman, eds. 1979). 
41 See, e.g., R. RUTLAND, THE BIRTH OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS, 1776-1791,41-47,126-
58 (1955) (discussing the enactment of the state constitutions and subsequent efforts to 
ratify the federal constitution); Briceland, Virginia: The Cement of the Union, in THE CON-
STITUTION AND THE STATES 222 (P. Conley & J. Kaminski eds. 1988) (five state ratifying 
conventions which called for a bill of rights shared a common dependence on George 
Mason's Virginia Declaration of Rights). 
42 A. BLAUSTEIN, THE INFLUENCE OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION ABROAD 13, 15 
(1986). 
43 See A. BLAUSTEIN & J. SIGLER, CONSTITUTIONS THAT MADE HISTORY ix (1988). 
44 See J. MOORE, supra note 2, at 67. 
45 J. MOORE, supra note 2, at 66; see C. VAN DOREN, supra note 7, at 527. 
46 "When Jefferson reached Paris he found more respect and veneration attached to 
the character of Dr. Franklin in France than to that of any other person, foreign or 
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ularity, Franklin continuously strove to educate the French about 
contemporary events in AmericaY Soon after Franklin arrived 
in France, and perhaps as a result of his efforts, extracts of the 
Declaration of Independence began to circulate throughout Eu-
rope.48 Later, at Franklin's instigation, a complete compilation of 
American state constitutions was made available.49 The young 
Duc de La Rouchfoucauld was persuaded by Franklin to translate 
the constitutional texts of all thirteen American states.50 At the 
urging of the American minister, the French ministry of foreign 
affairs officially authorized publication of Constitutions des Trieze 
Etats de I'Amerique in 1783,51 and thereafter circulated the docu-
ment throughout France.52 That same year, by order of Congress, 
Franklin delivered to each ambassador in Paris two copies of the 
work, while other copies were distributed throughout Europe.53 
Although prerevolutionary France did not lack for political theo-
reticians, one author has ventured that some Frenchman looked 
upon the collection of American state constitutions as a basic 
"grammar for Liberty."54 
As successor to Franklin, Thomas Jefferson, too, made impor-
tant contributions to the popularization of American liberal ideals 
in France. 55 It is particularly difficult, however, to judge the ex-
tent of his role, for once the French Revolution turned wantonly 
bloody, "[h ]ighly exaggerated statements about 0 efferson's] per-
native." C. VAN DOREN, supra note 7, at 713. See also id. at 578 (describing Franklin's 
overwhelming volume of correspondence and visitors); V. LASKA, BENJAMIN FRANKLIN: 
THE DIPLOMAT 75 (1982) (Franklin was "idolized, lionized, and popularized ... people 
paid good money just to be able to see him passing by."). 
47 J. MOORE, supra note 2, at 68-69. 
48 See id. at 67-68. 
49 [d. at 75. 
50 See C. VAN DOREN, supra note 7, at 572, 656; see also D. SCHOENBRUN, TRIUMPH IN 
PARIS: THE EXPLOITS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 95-96 (1976). 
51 A. BLAUSTEIN & J. SIGLER, supra note 43, at ix. 
52 See J. MOORE, supra note 2, at 75. 
53 See C. VAN DOREN, supra note 7, at 656; see also V. LASKA, supra note 46, at 139 
(Franklin "propagated the ideals of his new country ... by all means, among them the 
distribution of her states' constitutions."). 
54 C. VAN DOREN, supra note 7, at 656. 
55 Authors have differed over whether Jefferson was an uncritical Francophile. Kaplan 
characterizes Jefferson as "a tolerant and somewhat patronizing teacher of the French, 
encouraging them in their awkward groping toward democracy but recognizing that their 
lack of experience with freedom and responsibility would slow their advance." L. KAPLAN, 
supra note 3, at viii. 
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sonal part in the preliminaries and first stages ... were made. 
by his political foes"56-or so some contend. 
II 
Jefferson's objective, over a period of many years, had been to 
decrease American dependence on Britain through strengthened 
Franco-American ties. 57 In furtherance of this goal, Jefferson, 
like Franklin, cultivated numerous important relationships, and 
carried on voluminous correspondence with reformers not only 
in France, but in other parts of Europe. 58 An intimate friend of 
Lafayette and others at the forefront of the early French revo-
lutionary movement,59 Jefferson came to assume a role of signif-
icance. Though his principal biographer has argued that his part 
was small,60 others have gone so far as to assert that Jefferson 
was "perhaps the chief 'advisor' to the intellectuals who were 
creating the French Revolution."61 On several occasions, Jeffer-
son opened his home to leaders of disputing factions as a place 
for reasoned discussion.62 Acting discreetly because of his diplo-
matic status,63 he counseled these men on the principles of de-
56 D. MALONE. supra note 3, at xvi. 
57 See L. KAPLAN, supra note 3, at 59 (discussing jefferson's objectives as Secretary of 
State); see also id. at 14 (jefferson's attachment to France "rested for the most part on the 
practical advantages which close relations with France had given the United States"), 20 
(jefferson believed that France could replace Britain in the economic life of the United 
States and protect America from British military designs). 
5" See Ault, supra note 2, at 297 (noting "enormous correspondence"). 
59 See L. KAPLAN, supra note 3, at viii; J. MOORE, supra note 2, at 92; see also J. BOSHER, 
supra note 4, at 118; L. KAPLAN, supra note 3, at 16; D. MALONE, supra note 3, at 216 
(discussing ties with Lafayette and other liberal noblemen), 225 (in essence jefferson 
spoke through the mouth of Lafayette). 
Various authors have noted that "there exists a copy of the French Declaration of the 
Rights of Man and of Citizens with .Jefferson's editorial notes in the margin." See A. 
BLAUSTEIN, supra note 42, at 22; see also D. MALONE, supra note 3, at 223 (discussing 
Jefferson's proposed changes). But it is unclear when the notes were made and to what 
extent they were conveyed to Lafayette or others. 
60 See D. MALONE, supra note 3, at xvi ("In reality his personal part was slight, though 
the influence of the American example was great .... Insofar as he exerted a direct 
personal influence he did so primarily on Lafayette and a few other kindred spirits."). 
61 A. BLAUSTEIN, supra note 42, at 15. 
62 See D. MALONE, supra note 3, at 230; see aLw Ault, supra note 2, at 297 ("His house 
became a resort for French liberals."). 
63 See, e.g., D. MALONE, supra note 3, at 216-17 (discussing Jefferson's position in a 
controversy over the organization of the government and his private advice to Lafayette); 
L. KAPLAN, supra note 3, at 34 ("freely offered" advice to architects of the new govern-
ment); see also D. MALONE, supra note 3, at 224 (jefferson, as minister to France, distributed 
copies of a Virginia declaration of rights); but see D. MALONE, supra note 3, at 229 (noting 
that Jefferson declined to meet with the constitution committee on grounds of propriety). 
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mocracy, and on one occasion went so far as to draft a "Charter 
of Rights" for Lafayette.64 It has been said that Jefferson's draft 
"doubtless[ly],,65 influenced Lafayette, which is a matter of special 
note since ultimately it was Lafayette who proposed the enact-
ment of a bill of rights to the French National Assembly in July 
of 1789.66 Though the bill which he proposed differed from the 
one enacted, Lafayette's draft was clearly based on the American 
Declaration of Independence, which had been written chiefly by 
Thomas Jefferson. 67 
Jefferson and Franklin were by no means the only Americans 
who contributed to the promulgation of the Declaration of 
Rights.68 Others participated, and the extent of American behind-
the-scenes involvement is suggested by one author who recently 
wrote: 
[Lafayette sent a copy of his draft of the Declaration of 
Rights] to Jefferson in January, 1789, and Jefferson imme-
diately sent a copy on to Madison for comment. Gouverneur 
Morris, who arrived in Paris on February 3, 1789, as a rep-
resentative of certain American commercial interests, also 
studied the draft. He recommended a number of changes 
.... Advice from Jefferson, Madison, and Morris was sup-
plemented by Lafayette's conversations on the subject with 
Hamilton, Franklin, and Thomas Paine. Thus, while the fa-
mous French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the 
Citizen of August, 1789, was officially the work of Lafayette, 
Mirabeau, and Jean Joseph Mounier, it also had claim to 
American parentage.69 
In his memoirs, Lafayette stated that "his original proposal for a 
bill of rights ... was modeled upon the American bills."70 Al-
though that proposal was not enacted, and many changes oc-
curred during the drafting process, when the final draft of the 
Declaration of Rights was presented to the National Assembly, 
64 See Ault, supra note 2, at 299; see also D. MALONE, supra note 3, at 218 n.ll. 
65 See Ault, supra note 2, at 299; see also D. MALONE, supra note 3, at 223 ("jefferson's 
influence on the Marquis in this connection was probably greater than appears in any 
formal record"). 
66 See supra note 19. 
67 See J. MOORE, supra note 2, at 97-98. 
68 See A. BLAUSTEIN, supra note 42, at 10. 
69 [d. at 16; see also D. MALONE, supra note 3, at 223 (discussing jefferson's correspon-
dence with Madison). 
70 C. FRIEDRICH, THE IMPACT OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM ABROAD 74 (1967). 
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the reporter of the committee, the Archbishop of Bordeaux, is 
said to have "freely and fully acknowledged French indebtedness 
to America."7l 
As shown by the Appendix, a side-by-side comparison of the 
French document and provisions contained in antecedent Amer-
ican state constitutions reveals many similarities. Thus, while the 
first article of the Declaration of Rights begins by stating the 
premise that "[m]en are born, and always continue, free and equal 
in respect of their rights,"72 similar language may be found in at 
least four early state constitutions.73 For example, the Massachu-
setts Constitution of 1780 stated that "[a]ll men are born free and 
equal, and have certain natural, essential, and unalienable 
rights."74 So too, whereas the French document provided that 
"every citizen may speak, write, and publish freely,"75 the Penn-
sylvania Constitution enacted thirteen years earlier had stated in 
almost identical terms that "people have a right to freedom of 
speech, and of writing, and publishing their sentiments."76 Similar 
parallels may be drawn between language in the Declaration of 
Rights and the previously enacted American state constitutions 
dealing with individual rights to liberty and property,77 account-
ability of public officers,78 ex post facto laws,79 participation in 
the lawmaking process,80 taxation,8l and numerous other subjects 
as well.82 While the language used to express these ideas differed 
to a greater or lesser extent, and while certain provisions in the 
Declaration of Rights have no apparent American counterparts, 
the fact that the French authors drew upon the American con-
stitutions must be placed safely beyond doubt.83 
71 Ault, supra note 2, at 300. 
72 Declaration of Man, supra note 9, at art. I. 
73 See infra app. note 5. 
74 Mass. Canst. art. I (1780). 
75 Declaration of Man, supra note 9, at art. Xl. 
76 Penn. Canst. art. XII (1776). 
77 See infra app. note 6 and accompanying text. 
78 See infra app. note 24 and accompanying text. 
79 See infra app. note 14 and accompanying text. 
80 See infra app. note 8 and accompanying text. 
81 See infra app. notes 22-23 and accompanying text. 
82 See infra app. notes 3-27 and accompanying text. 
83 See G. JELLINEK, supra note 9, at 18, 20, 24-42 (comparison of declaration with 
provisions from various states); see also R. PALMER, THE AGE OF THE DEMOCRATIC REVO-
LUTION appendix (1959) (comparison of French and Virginia declarations); Ault, supra 
note 2, at 299. 
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III. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION OF RIGHTS' 
GUARANTEES 
A. Departure from the American Example 
Whereas the American Bill of Rights was not ratified until after 
the enactment of a constitution, the sequence in France was the 
reverse. Over the strong objection of some delegates,84 the Na-
tional Assembly voted to adopt a declaration of rights prior to 
resolving questions as to how the government should be restruc-
tured.85 
This decision to give priority to a statement of basic principles 
is readily understandable. The French delegates intended to work 
a fundamental change in the relationship between individuals 
and the state. It was, therefore, logical to first define, so far as 
possible, the object of their efforts. In substance, this aspect of 
the French Revolution does not differ significantly from the 
American experience, for by the time the U.S. Constitution was 
drafted, the Declaration of Independence, along with various 
state constitutions and bills of rights, had already articulated the 
fundamental goals of republican government and the basic rights 
of individuals.86 When the American Bill of Rights was finally 
enacted in 1791, in many respects it echoed that which had come 
before. 87 
Where the paths of the two countries significantly diverged was 
in the means chosen to enforce individual rights. The American 
Constitution, as is well known, created a government of separated 
84 See G. ANDREWS, supra note 16, at 19; P. GAXOTTE, supra note 8, at 112. 
85 See G. ANDREWS, supra note 16, at 19. 
86 See C. FRIEDRICH, supra note 70, at 73 ("the men of 1787 deemed it sufficient that 
these rights were guaranteed in the several state constitutions"). 
87 A number of the guarantees of the U.S. Bill of Rights can be traced not only to 
antecedent state documents but to British precedent. The Petition of Right, passed by 
Parliament in 1628, prohibited quartering of troops in private homes and detention or 
imprisonment of persons without cause. G. DAVIES, THE EARLY STUARTS, 1603-166041 
(2d. ed. 1959); see generally F. RELF, THE PETITION OF RIGHT (1917) (Ph.D. thesis at U. of 
Minn.). The Bill of Rights of 1689 guaranteed the right to petition the sovereign, the 
right to bear arms, the right to trial by jury, the right of free parliamentary debate, and 
prohibited excessive bail. Bill of Rights, 1689, 8 ENGLISH HISTORICAL DOCUMENTS 1660-
1714123-24 (A. Browning ed. 1953). 
The American Bill of Rights echoes earlier state codifications in part because they 
shared at least one common draftsman. James Madison, who played a crucial role in the 
writing of the U.S. Bill of Rights, had served on the committee which drafted Virginia's 
Declaration of Rights of 1776. Rumble, James Madison On the Value of Bills of Rights, in 
CONSTITUTIONALISM: NOMOS XX 122, 128 (J. Pennock &J. Chapman eds. 1979). 
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powers vested in three distinct branches. Although the constitu-
tional text left the question unresolved, it soon became clear, 
under the leadership of Chief Justice John Marshall, that the 
final authority to interpret the American Constitution-and thus 
the obligation to prevent infringement of the rights which it 
purported to confer-rested in the hands of an independent 
judiciary.88 This was the unique American contribution to the 
theory and practice of government, an idea which did not exist 
in any other system of government at that time.89 By and large, 
the arrangement has proved workable. The federal courts have 
been reasonably effective in protecting individuals from the shift-
ing winds of majority sentiment. 
That France did not settle upon precisely the same scheme in 
structuring its government is not surprising, for the conditions 
then prevailing in France greatly differed from those in the 
United States. The identification of the French judiciary with 
feudal oppression,90 the tradition of a French monarchy, the 
hereditary privileges and power of the nobility and clergy,91 and 
the lack of any real history of popular political or economic self-
determination,92 all suggested a different course. Jefferson, 
though keenly interested in French acceptance of republican 
88 See C. CASPER, Constitutionalism, 22 Occasional Papers from the Law School of the 
University of Chicago, 15-16 (1987), reprinted from THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTION 473 (L. Levy ed. 1986) (despite the fact that "Nowhere does the constitu-
tional text grant the power of judicial review of legislation ... the Supreme Court went 
ahead [in Marbury v. Madison] and in effect appointed itself and the other judges guardians 
of the Constitution") (brackets added), see Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 
(1803); see also C. FRIEDRICH, supra note 70, at 78-79 (discussing Hamilton's argument in 
The Federalist that the power of judicial review is implicit). 
89 Address by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, Northern Illinois University School 
of Law, de Kalb, Illinois 2 (Oct. 20, 1988) (copy available from the Public Information 
Office of the Supreme Court of the United States) [hereinafter Rehnquist address]. 
90 See COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITIONS, supra note 12, at 72; see also FRENCH PUBLIC 
LAW, supra note 18, at 559 (discussing defects in prerevolution system of justice in France). 
91 The division of the nation into classes and orders was abolished in the early days of 
the French Revolution. See FRENCH PUBLIC LAW, supra note 18, at 548. 
92 Cf C. HAZEN supra note 16, at 677 ("The first experiments of the French with 
parliamentary institutions were discouraging ... because Frenchmen had had no expe-
rience in working with them."); H. BELLOC, supra note 16, at 60 (prior to the revolution 
the power of the King, at least theoretically, was absolute). Compare with Ziskind, Judicial 
Tenure in the American Constitution: English and American Precedents, 1969 S. CT. REV. 135, 
135 ("When the representatives of the several States met to revise the Articles of Confed-
eration in May, 1786, they brought to bear a substantial knowledge of political theory 
and broad experience in the political process"). 
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principles,9:1 recognized this fact. He did not expect that Ameri-
can institutions could be successfully transplanted into French 
soil without modificationY-l As a compromise, Jefferson favored 
the adoption in France of a constitutional monarchy as the form 
of government then best suited to that country, a political ar-
rangement "modeled after Britain's, but purged of British 
flaws,"9:i 
In fact, the French experimented briefly and unsuccessfully 
with a constitutional monarchy?i before testing various republi-
can arrangements with even less success, What is significant is not 
so much the details of the allocation of power at these various 
stages, nor even the fact that the drafters of the first French 
constitution had "hoped to preserve the independence of the 
legislature and the judiciary by a system of divided powers, leg-
islative, executive, and judicial."97 Rather, what stands out is the 
fact that under neither the constitution of 1791 nor its successor, 
the constitution of 1793, did the French provide an effective 
means of enforcing the guarantees stated in the Declaration of 
Rights, to which continued adherence was professed, 
As W. Bourke Cockran noted with dismay at the turn of this 
century with respect to the French Constitution of 1793: 
[T]hat remarkable document sought to enforce its provisions 
by directing the constitution [which incorporated the provi-
sions of the 1789 Declaration of Rights] to be "written upon 
tablets and placed in the midst of the legislative body and in 
public places,"[so] that in the language of the Declaration of 
Rights "the people may always have before its eyes the fun-
damental pillars of its liberty and strength, and the authori-
ties the standard of their duties, and the legislator the object 
of his problem." The constitution of 1793 was placed "under 
'1:1 cf D, MALONE, supra note 3, at 228 (jefferson "never ceased rejoicing that 'the appeal 
to the rights of man, which had been made in the United States was taken up by France, 
first of the European nations"'). 
'I~ Cf L. KAPLAN, supra note 3, at 35 (aware of "France's political needs, ' . , LJeffersonJ 
never confused her revolution with the American Revolution") (brackets added). 
'I', [d, at 34; D. MALONE, supra note 3, at xvii (jefferson's "hope for France was not that 
the monarchy would be overthrown all of a sudden, but that it would assume a modified 
form, and head in the right direction-that is, toward individual freedom and self· 
government"), 
96 The first constitution, enacted in 1791, provided for a weak, legally restricted mono 
arch, while the Legislative Assembly was to enjoy extensive powers, See P. GAXOTTE, supra 
note 8, at 173-74; L. GERSHOY, supra note 16, at 28; see also A. BLAUSTEIN & J. SIGLER, 
supra note 43, at 81-83. 
97 J. BOSHER, supra note 4, at 136. 
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the guarantee of all the virtues," and the Declaration of 
Rights concluded by solemnly enacting that " . . . When 
government violates the rights of the people, insurrection of 
the people and of every single part of it is the most sacred 
of its rights and the highest of its duties." 
The framers of that constitution made a fatal mistake. They 
assumed that the mere declaration of certain privileges as the 
rights of citizens would actually secure those rights for each 
individual citizen. In practical operation, however, it was soon 
found that the sacred right of insurrection was too unwieldy 
a weapon to be wielded by a single arm. "All the virtues" 
proved to be indifferent guardians for a constitution assailed 
by all the passions. A mob thirsting for the blood of a victim 
did not pause to read the measure of his rights on tablets, 
however legibly inscribed or conspicuously posted. The leg-
islator, menaced by an infuriated populace, did not hesitate 
to seek his own security in the sacrifice of the lives of thou-
sands without regard to "the object of his problem."98 
B. Redress in the French Courts 
17 
To be sure, even during the French Revolution there were 
courts to which one could resort for legal redress. Indeed, the 
first constitution, enacted in 1791, effected a number of desirable 
judicial reforms.99 It substituted a unified court system in place 
of numerous existing tribunals (ecclesiastical, seignioral, admin-
istrative, and exceptional), abolishing their overlapping jurisdic-
tions and their accompanying special privileges. loo In addition, 
other reforms made access to the courts free for all citizens, and 
the judicial process was stabilized and simplified. lol 
Consistent with the republican ideals of the revolution, how-
ever, the constitution of 1791 also provided that judges were to 
98 Address of w. Bourke Cockran, in J. DILLON, 1 JOHN MARSHALL: LIFE, CHARACTER 
AND JUDICIAL SERVICES 407-08 (1903). 
99 See L. GERSHOY, supra note 16, at 28 (referring to "felicitous" reforms). Among the 
constructive changes affecting the administration of justice were the creation of a supreme 
court, the Court of Review, which tended to ensure uniform interpretation of the laws, 
and the endorsement of a new principle requiring courts to give reasons for their deci-
sions. See J. BRISSAUD, supra note 16, at 560-61. 
100 See J. BRISSAUD, supra note 16, at 559-61; L. GERSHOY, supra note 16, at 28; see also 
C. BRINTON, supra note 16, at 275. The idea of a single, graduated system of tribunals 
serving all alike was based on the principle of the sovereignty of the people. See A. 
MATHIEZ, supra note 5, at 90. 
WI See L. GERSHOY, supra note 16, at 29. 
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be elected, and thereby held accountable to the people. 102 This 
departure l03 from prior French practice, which lasted until about 
1800,104 arguably had important implications for efforts to realize 
the rights enshrined in the Declaration of Rights. As one writer 
has stated, by "making the judges elective, the Revolution abol-
ished the principle of irremovability of the magistracy, that is to 
say, the independence of judges."105 According to this view, 
judges who attempted to protect individual rights by rendering 
unpopular decisions were vehemently rebuked by the electo-
rate. \06 The effeet, it is said, was to silence those jurists who might 
otherwise have championed cases where civil rights clashed with 
the prevailing majoritarian will. 
There is likely some validity to this appraisal, for the American 
experience with state judiciaries reveals that some elected judges 
will decide cases not with a view to the merits, but with an eye to 
the next election.107 It is a different matter to say, however, that 
the prospect of being voted out of office was so potent during 
the French Revolution as to account for the near total collapse 
of the judiciary as a check on governmental abuse. IDS The past 
two centuries in the United States have shown that even during 
times of civil unrest or war the norm for elected judges has been 
faithful adherence to the laws. Despite certain unfortunate ex-
ceptions,109 faithlessness to guaranteed rights has never been the 
rule. Indeed, our history is replete with stories of heroic judges 
who have championed civil rights, regardless of the currents of 
public opinion. I 10 Thus, even when allowance is made for the 
102 See J. BRISSAUD, supra note Hi, at 561-62; FRENCH PUBLIC LAW, supra note 18, at 
547; L. GERSHOY, supra note 16, at 29. 
103 See J. BRISSAUD, supra note 16, at 561 ("election of the judges was one of the most 
radical innovations of the Constituent Assembly"). 
104 See id. at 562 (rule of irremovability reestablished). 
I05Id. 
106 When the judges "tried to apply the laws impartially, they were attacked with the 
greatest violence by the electors." Id. 
107 Cf Grodin,Judicial Elections: The California Experience, 70 JUDICATURE 365, 368 (1987) 
(discussing judicial election campaign contributions by attorneys); see generally Wold and 
Culver, The Defeat of the California Justices: The Campaign, the Electorate, and the Issue of 
Judicial Accountability, 70 JUDICATURE 348 (1987). 
108 See infra note III and accompanying text. 
109 See infra note 224 and accompanying text. 
110 See, e.g., T. SHAFFER, ON BEING A CHRISTIAN AND A LAWYER 144-52 (1981) (discussing 
judge james Horton of Alabama and the second capital rape prosecution of Haywood 
Patterson in 1933). 
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extraordinary pressures that surely were faced by French judges 
sitting amidst a revolution, it seems likely that if only loss of office 
was at stake, many judges would have chosen to stand for faithful 
adherence to the principles of the Declaration of Rights. 
To fully explain the fact that during the French Revolution the 
excessive use of violence by the state and others was largely 
"unchecked by normal judicial procedures,"111 one must look 
beyond the innovation of judicial election. When one does, four 
features emerge as significant: first, the handling of "political 
cases" was specialized so as to deprive the ordinary courts of 
jurisdiction; 112 second, the legislature commonly interfered with 
the trying of such suits; 113 third, procedures operating in favor 
of the accused were increasingly restricted statutorily or other-
wise; 114 and fourth, judges who failed to submit to the legislative 
will faced not merely loss of position but, in the absence of im-
munity for their official acts, the prospect of prosecution for 
disloyalty, and consequently capital punishment. ll5 
C. The Reign of Terror and the Revolutionary Tribunal of Paris 
Beginning in 1793,116 the French government commenced a 
systematic "Reign of Terror" (Terror) for the alleged purpose of 
purging society of those corrupt and wicked influences which 
purportedly constituted an obstacle to true constitutional govern-
ment. ll7 Pursuant to this plan, the constitution of June 24, 1793, 
III C. BRINTON, supra note 16, at 160. 
112 See infra notes 116-40 and accompanying text. 
113 See infra notes 141-58 and accompanying text. 
114 See infra notes 159-91 and accompanying text. 
lIS See infra notes 192-208 and accompanying text. 
116 Although it is generally agreed that the Reign of Terror (Terror) ended with the 
death of Robespierre on July 27, 1794. scholars disagree as to when the Terror began. 
All define it differently. See, e.g., J. BOSHER, supra note 4, at 178 (Terror began Friday, 
August 10, 1792); C. HAZEN, supra note 16, at 674-75 (implicitly suggesting that the 
Terror began on October 10, 1793, when the constitution of June 24, 1793 was set aside); 
C. MOFFETT, supra note 6, at 179 (Terror began in 1789). The consensus appears to be 
that it covered at least part of 1793 and the first seven months of 1794. 
117 C. HAZEN, supra note 16, at 674. Scholars differ as to the goals which animated the 
architects of the Terror. A few have ventured that the Terror was an economic measure, 
a means of killing thousands of people and seizing their property in order to address the 
severe and continuing national financial crisis. See J. BOSHER, supra note 4, at 194; 
P. GAXOTTF., supra note 8, at 306; A. MATHIEZ, supra note 5, at 395. But the larger number 
of writers have depicted the Terror as an ideological act of purification deemed prereq-
uisite to true constitutional government. See, e.g., C. BRINTON, supra note 16, at 158-63. 
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was suspended within months of its adoption for the duration of 
the war. IIS In its stead was substituted "a sort of codification, with 
innovations and amendments, of a large number of earlier de-
crees establishing various organs and methods" of government. 119 
Based on a rejection of the principle of separation of powers,120 
the procedures installed by this decree, which became known as 
the '''Constitution of the Terror,"'121 were intended to "check 
unrest at home in the face of national danger,"122 and to preserve 
the liberties of 1789 by "provisionally" destroying them. 123 
Consisting both of instigated popular violence and brutal use 
of governmental force, the hallmark of the Terror was death, 
whether inflicted suddenly or with a slight delay to conform with 
"legal" procedures. 124 Those who opposed the state were increas-
ingly subject to arrest,125 and "suspects," who were arrested on 
the flimsiest of reasons, filled the prisons. 126 "Streetlamp lynch-
ings and destruction of property ... were ... daily occurrences," 
which accompanied "a nightmarish series of house-to-house visits 
by roving search parties, armed with batches of freshly printed 
warrants."127 Procedural limitations did not prevent such war-
rants from being enforced. 128 
118 See C. HAZEN, supra note 16, at 675 (the Convention suspended the constitution on 
October 10, 1793). 
119 [d. 
120 [d. at 674. 
121 L. GERSHOY, supra note 16, at 61. 
122 Ault, supra note 2, at 304. See also C. HAZEN, supra note 16, at 674 (adopted to deal 
with "state of distress"). 
123 C. HAZEN, supra note 16, at 674-75. 
124 See J. BOSHER, supra note 4, at 178 (discussing popular violence); TEN YEARS, supra 
note 3, at 49 (at ad hoc trials in September 1792,1200 prisoners were sentenced to death 
in four days); C. MOFFETT, supra note 6, at 48-50 (discussing janitor-judge sentencing 
person after person to death for 36 continuous hours at pseudo-hearings during civil 
riots amidst a cheering crowd). 
125 Because those loyal to the Crown became traitors when the monarchy fell, political 
arrests occurred daily. See C. BRINTON, supra note 16, at 88; see also J. BOSHER, supra note 
4, at 180. 
126 C. MOFFETT, supra note 6, at 42. See also C. HAZEN, supra note 16, at 700. 
127 C. MOFFETT, supra note 6, at 8; see also TEN YEARS, supra note 3, at -- (discussing 
house-to-house searches for "suspects"). "[PJolitical moderates who did not hide were 
often ... murdered along with the rest, their bodies plundered, stripped, mutilated, and 
the heads hacked off and paraded on pikes." J. BOSHER, supra note 4, at 178. 
128 See C. BRINTON, supra note 16, at 122; C. HAZEN, supra note 16, at 688 (The local 
committees that were charged with issuing writs against "suspected" persons "often abused 
their powers and imprisoned many entirely innocent persons."). 
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Once confined, prisoners were often beaten,129 starved,130 
raped,131 or executed without trial. 132 Those who survived these 
abuses, and who did not commit suicide in despair,133 stood little 
chance of an impartial hearing or fair treatment. Political cases,134 
the suits most likely to involve claims of fundamental right, were 
removed from the ordinary courts and channelled into a special 
system of "revolutionary justice." Headed by the Revolutionary 
Tribunal of Paris,135 this system included local and military tri-
bunals which adopted similar methods. 136 The function of revo-
lutionary justice, in stark but accurate terms, was not to provide 
equal treatment, nor to fairly enforce the rule of law, but to 
129 Beatings were administered by guards or by vigilantes who gained entry to the 
prisons. See A. MATHIEZ, supra note 5, at 353; J. BOSHER, supra note 4, at 179 (discussing 
massacre of more than 1000 prisoners at seven prisons including fourteen prisoners in 
full view of several hundred persons); c. MOFFETT, supra note 6, at 46 (suspects were 
permitted to fall victim to mobs en route to prison), 49, 116. Frequently, "invaders formed 
themselves into an impromptu court .... One by one prisoners were brought from their 
cells before this tribunal, sitting in an inner court or hall, summarily charged and tried, 
and if found guilty, pushed into the street or outer court, where they were killed by a 
small group of chosen murderers." C. BRINTON, supra note 16, at S9; see also C. MOFFETT, 
supra note 6, at 47-4S. In numerous cases, severed body parts were impaled on spikes 
and displayed about the city. See C. MOFFETT, supra note 6, at 53. 
130 See id. at 110. 
131 See id. at 54. 
132 See A. MATHIEZ, supra note 5, at 402; C. MOFFETT, supra note 6, at 45 (discussing 
resolution providing that all priests and suspect persons held in certain facilities would 
be put to death), lOS-IS (mass drownings unaccompanied by trials); see also H. BELLOC, 
supra note 16, at 90 (discussing massacre of prisoners by organized band of assassins). 
133 See J. BOSHER, supra note 4, at 195; see also C. HAZEN, supra note 16, at 706 (Condorcet, 
one of the fathers of the constitution of 1793, "committed suicide or perhaps ... died of 
hunger."). 
134 The legislation of March 10 and II, 1793, establishing the Revolutionary Tribunal, 
provided: 
An extraordinary criminal tribunal shall be established at Paris which shall 
have cognizance of all counter-revolutionary activities, of all attacks against the 
liberty, the equality, the unity, the indivisibility of the Republic, the internal and 
external security of the state, and of all plots tending to reestablish the monarchy 
or to establish any other authority inimical to the liberty, equality or sovereignty 
of the people, regardless of whether the culprits should be employees of the 
government, military personnel, or plain citizens. 
Godfrey, supra note 16, at 7. 
135 Theoretically, the Paris Tribunal was intended to "replace the supreme tribunal of 
the people's vengeance" by expediting the trial of suspects and securing convictions by 
"all possible means." J. BOSHER, supra note 4, at 193 (quoting Georges-Jacques Danton 
and Robert Lindet, respectively). 
136 See TEN YEARS, supra note 3, at 63 (petty revolutionary courts were more or less 
independent from the Paris Tribunal); see also R. PALMER, supra note 16, at 155, 169 
(discussing tribunals in Lyons), IS5, IS9 (in Alsace), 219-20 (in Brittany). 
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enable the government to remain in power137 by efficiently and 
expeditiously138 eliminating its enemies139 or filling them with 
terror. 140 Thus, political defendants, those most in need of invok-
ing the guarantees of the Declaration of Rights, were deprived 
of any real opportunity to be judged according to those principles 
by being routed to tribunals expressly dedicated to contrary ob-
jectives. 
D. Interference with Judicial Duties and Prosecutorial Discretion 
From its inception,141 the Revolutionary Tribunal (Tribunal) 
was a minion of the National Convention (Convention), the chief 
legislative body following the enactment of the constitution of 
1793. Created by the Convention, the Tribunal consisted of 
judges and jurors elected by the Convention, who often served 
very short terms.142 Some of the judges lacked legal credentials 
and others had limited judicial experience. 143 However, these 
matters were deemed unimportant, for the chief requirement for 
the positions was ideological loyalty. When the work of the judges 
and jurors displeased the Convention, they were promptly re-
moved from office, and more suitable replacements were 
named. 144 
A public prosecutor, also chosen by the Convention, was em-
powered to initiate cases. 145 However, the Convention frequently 
intervened in prosecutorial affairs. First, through its Committee 
of General Security, the Convention commonly ordered the re-
lease of prisoners prior to trial, both before and after the holding 
I37 See J. BOSHER, supra note 4, at 181. 
138 "The essential feature of this Revolutionary Government was rapidity of action." C. 
HAZEN, supra note 16, at 690. 
139 See Godfrey, supra note 16, at 4; see also TEN YEARS, supra note 3, at 64 (the Terror 
was an instrument designed to strike down real and presumed counter-revolutionaries); 
C. HAZEN, supra note 16, at 693. 
140 See C. HAZEN, supra note 16, at 682. 
141 The Tribunal was created in March, 1793, and abolished at the end of May, 1795. 
See Godfrey, supra note 16, at 4, 116. 
142 See id. at 8, 16; see also A. MATHIEZ, supra note 5, at 395 (initially temporary judges 
were appointed in a rush to commence operations). 
143 See Godfrey, supra note 16, at 27. 
144 See id. at 4, 44; cf FRENCH PUBLIC LAW, supra note 18, at 561-62 (stating, without 
reference to the Revolutionary Tribunal, that under the constitution of 1793, "[T]he 
Convention annulled the judgments of the elected magistrates, tried cases itself, dismissed 
the judges, and elected new ones."). 
145 See J. BOSHER, supra note 4, at 194. 
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of preliminary examinations. 146 Second, this same committee 
often furnished the Tribunal with evidence concerning not the 
circumstances of the crime, but the undesirable position which 
the suspect occupied in his community. 147 Third, the Convention 
reserved to itself, and frequently exercised, the considerable pre-
rogative of determining whether its members, and whether ex-
ecutive ministers or army generals, would be tried before the 
Tribunal. 148 Fourth, pursuant to lists prepared nightly by its Com-
mittee of General Security, the Convention forwarded to the 
prosecutor numerous other, non-elite suits for appropriate legal 
action. 149 Fifth, during certain celebrated political trials, the Com-
mittee directed that prisoners who "resisted or insulted" the sys-
tem of justice should be silenced. 150 Finally, during the latter 
stages of the Tribunal's history, committees of the Convention 
injected themselves into the determination of whether a person 
against whom no legally justified charges existed would be re-
leased from government custody.151 
These various actions frustrated any possibility that a tradition 
of independent professional judgment might be developed by 
the public prosecutor. All of the cases forwarded by the Conven-
tion arrived before the Tribunal clearly marked with the stigma 
of guilt, the verdict in such proceedings being a foregone conclu-
sion. 152 In other suits, the evidence furnished or opinion ex-
146 See Godfrey, supra note 16, at 117-18. 
147 See id. at 123. 
148 See C. HAZEN, supra note 16, at 676 (discussing Convention's decision to have Marat 
arrested and similar "proscriptions" that followed); J. BOSHER, supra note 4, at 194. 
149 See C. HAZEN, supra note 16, at 681 (the Convention's "Committee of General Security 
... selected the prisoners who were to be sent before the Revolutionary Tribunal .... 
Night after night it ground away at the preparation of the fatal lists"); Godfrey, supra 
note 16, at 13, 15, 54-56. While the instances of direct or indirect involvement by the 
Convention were numerous, in many cases it had nothing to do with the trial of the 
accused. [d. at 58. 
150 R. PALMER, supra note 16, at 300. 
151 See Godfrey, supra note 16, at 132, 148. 
152 See id. at 57. 
[C]harges levied by the Convention-and this was especially true of the charges 
against its members-were of such an authority that in the subsequent trials the 
Convention, in a very real sense, may be said to have participated in the finding 
of the verdict and the pronouncement of the judgment. 
[d. at 57. See also id. at 58 (documents forwarded by a committee of the Convention 
strengthened the presumption of guilt); cf H. BELLOC, supra note 16, at 105 (Of the 2000 
or more of those executed at the direction of the Revolutionary Tribunal, "the large 
majority were those whom the [Convention's] Committee of Public Safety judged to be 
obstacles to their military policy."). 
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pressed by the Convention ensured that the suspect would be 
cast in a light favorable to the radical objectives of revolutionary 
justice. 153 
As a result, there was little separation of legislative, executive, 
and judicial powers. 154 The prosecutor acted on the order of the 
Convention's committees, and the judges "fell into step" with 
him.155 Describing the functioning of the Tribunal, one writer 
recently stated: 
Late in the evening, after the day's work, [the prosecutor] 
used to visit the [Convention's] committees to discuss cases 
with them and receive his orders. The jurymen . . . did 
nothing to distinguish guilt from innocence, and could not 
have done so even if they had wished to. Charges were hope-
lessly vague, and the tribunal had neither the time nor the 
inclination to seek the truth in particular cases .... At least 
two [of the twelve] jurors passed the time sketching the pris-
oners, and others made ribald jokes about them and their 
almost certain death. 156 
For those found guilty by the Revolutionary Tribunal, death by 
guillotine was the likely and final sentence. 157 From a judgment 
of the Tribunal, there was no appeal of findings as to law or 
fact. 15S 
E. The Decline of Procedural Protection of the Accused 
Although it has been said that during the Terror "to be accused 
generally meant to be found guilty,"159 this is an overstatement, 
for at least during its early days a significant number of cases 
before the Revolutionary Tribunal resulted either in acquittal or 
in dismissal of charges for lack of evidence. 16o Some of these 
153 Cf Godfrey, supra note 16, at 124. 
15. See id. at 64 (accord). 
155 J. BOSHER, supra note 4, at 194; see also Godfrey, supra note 16, at 60, 66 (the 
Convention's important Committee on Public Safety and the Tribunal frequently "went 
hand in hand"), 131 (noting pressure on Tribunal from dominant committees in govern-
ment). 
156 J. BOSHER, supra note 4, at 194. 
157 Deportation and imprisonment were levied as sanctions in a small number of cases. 
See Godfrey, supra note 16, at 108 n.20. 
158 See A. MATHIEZ, supra note 5, at 395. 
159 R. SOBEL, supra note 16, at 110. 
160 One writer summarizes the work of the Paris Tribunal as follows: "5283 persons 
appeared before the Revolutionary Tribunal; of these 1273 were acquitted and 973 
dismissed for lack of evidence while 2747 were sentenced to death, 32 deported, 44 
sentenced to prison, 163 detained, and 51 referred to another tribunal." Godfrey, supra 
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failures to convict may be accounted for by the fact that during 
its first stages, the Tribunal functioned much as a typical criminal 
court,161 acting in a "reasonably fair" manner,162 willing to afford 
the accused important procedural protections. Preliminary hear-
ings were held; 163 formal charges were prepared carefully; 164 the 
accused was entitled to representation by counsel165 and to sum-
mon and present witnesses; 166 cross-examination was permit-
ted; 167 and, at least occasionally, extensive testimony was heard. 168 
During this period, the Tribunal was distinguished not by the 
special quality of its procedures, but by the fact that under rev-
olutionary law the penalties imposed were of a final nature, usu-
ally condemning the accused to death. 169 
As the political pace of the Terror accelerated to a frenzy, 170 
the Tribunal was increased in size and empowered to sit in sec-
note 16, at lOS n.20. The example of the Paris Tribunal was readily followed by other 
courts which had adopted the methods of revolutionary justice. In the provinces, so-called 
judicial proceedings accounted for 16,000 to IS,OOO deaths. C. HAZEN, supra note 16, at 
707. 
161 See C. BRINTON, supra note 16, at 126; cf Godfrey, supra note 16, at 10 ("There was 
little in the institutional form of the Tribunal that could have excited alarm"). 
162 C. HAZEN, supra note 16, at 6S4. 
163 See Godfrey, supra note 16, at 117-18 (discussing procedures). 
164 See id. at 119, 126. 
165 See id. at 119, 125 ("The voice of the defense, while not a loud one, was not stifled 
during the first year of the Tribunal's operations"). 
166 See C. HAZEN, supra note 16, at 684; Godfrey, supra note 16, at 124. 
167 See C. BRINTON, supra note 16, at 126; C. HAZEN, supra note 16, at 684. 
168 See Godfrey, supra note 16, at 121-22 (discussing case in which 140 witnesses ap-
peared against the defendants and 100 appeared for them); cf id. at 121 ("At times the 
Tribunal-in view of its function as an instrument of revolutionary justice-went beyond 
what might have been expected in the search for evidence."), 129 ("During the first year 
... the Tribunal was rather patient with the oral testimony .... "). 
169 See id. at 127. 
170 The increasingly hurried pace of the Tribunal is suggested by the fact that while it 
sentenced only 70 persons to death during its first six months, more than 500 were 
guillotined by the end of its first year, and nearly 2700 died before the Terror ended less 
than seventeen months after the Tribunal was created. See J. BOSHER, supra note 4, at 
194; Godfrey, supra note 16, at 131 (50 percent of the Tribunal's death sentences were 
handed down during the two months preceding the death of Robespierre). The Tribunal, 
of course, was only the apex of the revolutionary justice zigurat which, as a whole, 
sentenced about 15,000 or 16,000 to death after mock trials. See J. BOSHER, supra note 4, 
at 192. 
The pressure for ever-faster purging of unpatriotic persons from the body politic 
extended to the execution process. When even the swift guillotine was perceived as being 
too slow, alternative methods were adopted. On one occasion, sixty young men were 
arrayed in a line and then fired upon by canons. This procedure was abandoned, however, 
when it was learned that the technique left most of the victims horribly mutilated but 
alive. See C. HAZEN, supra note 16, at 711 (soldiers were required to kill the survivors "by 
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tions. l7l Procedural safeguards for the accused were sacrificed to 
the goals of quantity and speed as the public prosecutor, judges, 
and jurors grew both more aware of the social mission of 
revolution l72 and more willing to allow the Tribunal to be "em-
ployed by politicians to rid themselves of personal enemies."173 
"[P]olitical murder for political ends" became a chief goal of 
revolutionary justice. 174 To that extent, the excesses of the Tri-
bunal were the result of the abandonment by the Convention 
and its committees of considered principles in favor of a political 
agenda. 
Preliminary· hearings were eliminated,175 and at times as many 
as fifty wholly unrelated defendants were "amalgamated" into 
"batches" for purposes of trial. 176 The role of defense counsel, 
always unattractive because of the political complexion of the 
Tribunal,l77 was at first rendered perfunctory,178 then terminated 
entirely, as the profession of barrister was abolished in favor of 
a system which allowed anyone to act as counselor before the 
court. 179 The theory behind this change may have been that "the 
virtue of the jurors in the formal trial . . . [would adequately 
substitute for representation by defense counsel because] the hon-
esty and patriotism of the jurors would prevent the successful 
prosecution of any true patriot."180 More likely, as one writer 
concluded, the effect of these changes was that "[ d]efendants 
were exploited by unscrupulous individuals who played upon 
their fears."181 
Special legislation was enacted by the Convention whenever the 
procession of judicial business was perceived as too slow to satisfy 
slashing them to death with their swords"); C. MOFFETT, supra note 6, at 138; A. MATHIEZ, 
supra note 5, at 401. 
171 See C. HAZEN, supra note 16, at 683. 
172 See id. at 684. C. BRINTON, supra note 16, at 126; Cf Godfrey, supra note 16, at 119 
(noting that increasing rapidity prevented careful consideration of all available evidence), 
135 (increasing tendency to use Tribunal "as an instrument of class war"). 
173 See C. HAZEN, supra note 16, at 683. 
174Id. at 699. 
175 See Godfrey, supra note 16, at 132. 
176 See P. GAXOTTE, supra note 8, at 312; Godfrey, supra note 16, at 131, 133-34; A. 
MATHIEZ, supra note 5, at 499; see also C. HAZEN, supra note 16, at 704 (describing trial en 
bloc). 
177 See J. BOSHER, supra note 4, at 194. 
178 See Godfrey, supra note 16, at 130. 
179 See J. BOSHER, supra note 4, at 194. 
180 Godfrey, supra note 16, at 132. 
181 J. BOSHER, supra note 4, at 194. 
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political needs. 182 One law permitted jurors to end a trial when-
ever they had heard enough to make up their minds, so long as 
three days had passed. 183 Regardless of the stage of the proceed-
ings, the judge would be silenced, the attorneys discharged, and 
the proceedings terminated by a sudden and irreversible ver-
dict. 184 Because even three days per trial can be a slow pace during 
a revolution, however, other legislation made the hearing of wit-
nesses unnecessary when "documentary or intellectual (morales) 
proofs of guilt existed independently of testimonial evidence."185 
This might not have caused a noticeable deterioration in the 
quality of the justice dispensed by the Tribunal, for documentary 
evidence was often comprehensive. 186 But with the increased 
number of persons appearing before the Tribunal, less time was 
available to study the assembled evidence. 187 
Another law allowed defendants to be found guilty of obstruct-
ing justice when statements they made in their own behalf were 
deemed to give rise to unnecessary delay.188 In practice, this rule 
was often applied so as to strictly limit a defendant's presentation 
of a defense. When large groups of suspects were tried en bloc, 
the president of the Tribunal, despite prosecutorial intercessions, 
often would not allow a defendant to speak beyond answering to 
his name. 189 Trials were reduced to little more than the physical 
presence of the accused in the courtroom. 190 
In the end, according to the late professor Charles Hazen of 
Columbia University, the Revolutionary Tribunal: 
[S]tood as a sign and symbol of arbitrary and remorseless 
tyranny, more odious and hateful because of the hypocrisy 
of its pretense to be dispensing only justice. It earned so black 
a reputation by the iniquities it committed that it took its 
1"2 See generally Godfrey, supra note 16, at 21, 128. 
1"3 See Godfrey, supra note 16, at 128; A. MATHIEZ, supra note 5, at 399; see also C. 
MOFFETT, supra note 6, at 134-35 (no room was left for "quibbling" or "hair-splitting"). 
1"4 See C. HAZEN, supra note 16, at 684 ("Often, after some brief semblance of investi-
gation, the judges would ask the jury if it was convinced, an affirmative answer would be 
given, and a verdict of guilt immediately rendered. The judges would then pronounce 
the sentence of death, often taking occasion by the way to abuse and insult the unhappy 
victim in coarse and brutal fashion. Execution would follow immediately .... "). 
IS5 See Godfrey, supra note 16, at 128 (parenthesis in original), 132. 
186 See id. at 132, 134-35. 
IR7 See id. at 133 (point stated), 134. 
1"8 See C. MOFFETT, supra note 6, at 106, 164. 
I"" See Godfrey, supra note 16, at 134. 
190 See R. PALMER, supra note 16, at 365-66. 
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place in the minds and memories of men alongside the In-
quisition as the embodiment of the most malignant passions 
known to the human race. 191 
F. Freedom of Expression and the Law of Suspects 
The grand pronouncements of the Declaration of Rights con-
cerning free expression were subordinated during the Terror to 
the perceived needs of the revolution. 192 In the name of ideolog-
ical conformity, books and pamphlets were censored;193 theaters 
were expected to produce appropriately stirring patriotic fare; 194 
royalist newspapers were closed and their confiscated presses 
redistributed to left-wing journalists. 195 
Consistent with the "terrorizing" objectives of these restrictions, 
the Convention, on September 17, 1793, enacted the broad-
ranging196 Law of Suspects. 197 A "draconian"198 piece of legisla-
tion, this law institutionalized and greatly expanded the hitherto 
intermittent and random199 arresting of persons whose acts or 
beliefs were perceived as inimical to the interests of the nation. 
Small groups of men in every town and hamlet were given ty-
rannical powers of oppression over those they opposed, with few 
procedures for reviewing whether they acted for patriotic or 
ignoble reasons.200 
The Law of Suspects defined several classes of persons subject 
to immediate arrest and imprisonment, including but not limited 
191 C. HAZEN, supra note 16, at 684. 
192 These moves formed merely one piece of a larger fabric. As Professor Hazen has 
stated: 
The authors of the Declaration of the Rights of Man of the Constitution of 1791 
had been determined to protect the individual and had been willing to weaken 
the state to that end. Now, in 1793, the state had become everything, the indi-
vidual nothing, save as he served the state. 
[d. at 690. 
19' See C. BRINTON, supra note 16, at 148; C. MOFFETT, supra note 6, at 122. 
194 C. MOFFETT, supra note 6, at 43; see also C. BRINTON, supra note 16, at 147. 
195 See J. BOSHER, supra note 4, at 180-81. 
196 See C. HAZEN, supra note 16, at 694 ("comprehensive and elastic"); R. PALMER, supra 
note 16, at 67 (the law defined suspects so "vaguely" that "almost anyone might find 
himself compromised"). 
197 See generally A. MATHIEZ, supra note 5, at 370-71. 
198 See TEN YEARS, supra note 3, at 61. 
199 See A. MATHIEZ, supra note 5, at 370-71. 
200 See C. HAZEN, supra note 16, at 695; R. PALMER, supra note 16, at 146 (committees 
had such discretion that they could denounce as suspects even those to whom the law did 
not apply). 
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to those persons who by "their remarks or their writings show[ed] 
themselves [to be] the partisans of tyranny or federalism and the 
enemies of liberty"201 and "public functionaries suspended or 
removed from their functions by the National Convention or its 
commissioners and not reinstated."202 As described by a leading 
writer: 
These provisions, elastic as they were, suspended a terrible 
threat over the heads not only of real suspects, but of all 
those capable of giving trouble to the Government, and, what 
was more, of the indifferent and timid, since it included even 
those citizens whose only fault was that they had failed to 
fulfill their duties as electors.203 
Under the Law of Suspects, the discharge of a disloyal official 
was promptly followed by imprisonment. 204 
The extent to which the passage of the Law of Suspects affected 
the performance of the judges and jurors of the Revolutionary 
Tribunal is a matter of speculation. Such risks undoubtedly dis-
couraged some persons from accepting such positions,205 and it 
seems likely that those who did accept would have been greatly 
influenced in the exercise of their official discretion. 206 Partici-
pating day after day in pseudo-legal proceedings which more 
often than not culminated in a capital sentence,207 these men 
must have poignantly appreciated the cost of less than zealous 
devotion to the objectives of the Terror. What is certain is that 
stripped of any semblance of immunity for their official actions, 
the judges and jurors of the Revolutionary Tribunal played no 
significant role in curbing the government's use of institutional-
ized violence. 208 
201 TEN YEARS, supra note 3, at 157. 
202 [d. 
203 A. MATHIEZ, supra note 5, at 371; see also P. GAXOTTE, supra note 8, at 306. 
204 A. MATHIEZ, supra note 5, at 371. 
205 See Godfrey, supra note 16, at 12 (suggesting that fear of reprisal and "the necessity 
of voting publicly in cases involving powerful conspirators" accounted for some refusals 
to serve). 
206 Cf R. PALMER, supra note 16, at 300 (suggesting that during the trial of Danton, the 
judge and prosecutor were "terrified themselves at the thought that their own heads 
depended on getting a conviction"). 
207 See supra note 160. 
208 The lack of legislative immunity also adversely affected the official conduct of the 
members of the National Convention. See C. HAZEN, supra note 16, at 676-77. 
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IV. CONCLUSION: THE LEGACY OF 1789 
The Reign of Terror ended in July, 1794, with the death of its 
leader, Maximilien Robespierre.209 Although the Revolution con-
tinued for several more years,210 that event marked the turning 
point in the history of the Tribunal. Sickened by the killing and 
emotionally exhausted, the French nation, so long rapt in an 
atmosphere of violence and fear,211 retreated from the idee fixe of 
the Terror, and began to dismantle its machinery.212 Weakened 
at first, the Revolutionary Tribunal of Paris was abolished on May 
31, 1795, shortly after Fouquier-Tinville, its public prosecutor 
and accomplice in so many deaths, was placed on trial, convicted, 
and beheaded like countless others.213 Soon thereafter, a new 
constitution-France's third-was adopted; it would last about 
five years. 214 
By the end, the dictatorship which was known as the Reign of 
Terror had exacted a horrendous toll. Though the figures seem 
high, according to various estimates, approximately 300,000 per-
sons had been imprisoned,215 100,000 massacred,216 20,000 exe-
cuted without trial or allowed to die in confinement,217 and an-
other 20,000 or more guillotined as enemies of the state. 218 
209 See supra note 116. But see H. BELLOC, supra note 16, at 57-58 (rejecting the view 
that Robespierre was the "master" of the Terror). 
210 Some scholars date the French Revolution as having ended in 1799, as is reflected 
by the titles of the works by Gershoy and Brinton, cited supra in note 16. But see Berman, 
supra note 4, at 616 (suggesting preferable dates are 1789 to 1830). Cf. A. LOOMIS, supra 
note 16, at 12 ("Anarchy ... preceded the institution of the Revolutionary Tribunal; 
dictatorship followed it"). 
211 The "essence" of the Revolutionary government "was the fear men have of death." 
C. HAZEN, supra note 16, at 688. 
For an interesting discussion of the role fear played in keeping members of the National 
Convention from attending its sessions or voting on controversial issues, see id. at 676-
77. 
212 See D. JOHNSON, supra note 16, at 100. 
213 See L. GERSHOY, supra note 16, at 72; Godfrey, supra note 16, at 23, 53. 
214 See A. BLAUSTEIN, supra note 42, at 33 n.20; see also supra note 18. 
215 See R. SOBEL, supra note 16, at 110. 
216 See J. BOSHER, supra note 4, at 192. 
217 See C. MOFFETT, supra note 6, at 179; see also C. HAZEN, supra note 16, at 708 
(discussing mass shooting of prisoners without trial), 709 (discussing mass drownings of 
prisoners on boats in the Loire River, accounting for 2,800 to 4,200 deaths). 
m See C. HAZEN, supra note 16, at 707 (the Paris Tribunal and similar provincial courts 
accounted for 20,000 deaths); C. MOFFETT, supra note 6, at 179; but see J. BOSHER, supra 
note 4, at 192 (15,000 or 16,000 people were executed "after the mock trials of revolu-
tionary tribunals"); TEN YEARS, supra note 3, at 64 (in 1793-94, "with some semblance of 
a formal trial the Terror took the toll of 40,000 men and women"); Berman, supra note 
4, at 615 ("in all, there were over 14,000 victims of the Terror and civil war"). 
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The complicity of the Revolutionary Tribunal of Paris and 
other courts in the abuses of the Reign of Terror ranks as one 
of the most ignominious episodes in the history of legal institu-
tions. Their story is a catalogue of the risks of judicial infidelity 
to fundamental rights, legislative interference with the adjudica-
tory process, diminished procedural protection of the accused, 
and the absence of judicial immunity. It is a tale which is depress-
ing and sobering, and it underscores the fact that judicial inde-
pendence and tenure, fair procedures, and immunity from suit 
for official actions are important components of a just court sys-
tem. Nevertheless, it would be unfair to judge the reformers 
whose efforts gave rise to the French Revolution by the failures 
of the Tribunal or the excesses of the Terror. 
There is, first of all, a serious question as to whether any 
nascent government, through any written constitution, could 
have enforced the terms of the Declaration of Rights under the 
conditions then extant in France. Less than five years into its 
constitutional history at the time of the Reign of Terror, the 
French nation was torn not only by a severe economic crisis,219 
but by the civil clash of competing revolutionary and counter-
revolutionary forces,22o and by the onerous burdens of a war 
simultaneously waged with foreign nations. 221 Some have sug-
gested that an independent judiciary, similar to that in the United 
States, could have stayed the carnage of the Terror.222 But when 
one recalls the impotence of Chief Justice Roger Taney to enforce 
the habeas corpus provisions of the U.S. Constitution over Pres-
219 See J. BOSHER, supra note 4, at 3 (noting overcrowding, scarcity of food, and economic 
inflexibility), 179 (riots were triggered by concern over subsistence); TEN YEARS, supra 
note 3, at 63 (bread was rationed); cf. C. HAZEN, supra note 16, at 696,714-52; C. VAN 
DOREN, supra note 7, at 657. 
220 See, e.g., A. MATHIEZ, supra note 5, at 334, 344, 386. 
221 See supra note 4. Cf. J. BOSHER, supra note 4, at 283-84 (French armies conquered 
and plundered all of continental Europe between 1793 and 1814). 
222 For example, Chief Justice William Rehnquist, discussing the abuses to which the 
Tribunal was a party, recently stated: 
It seems rather obvious to me that the reason it happened was that during the 
Reign of Terror there was no separation of powers in the French government 
at all .... [T]here was no organ of government in France at the time which 
would stand up and enforce them on behalf of the individual. 
Rehnquist Address, supra note 89, at 11-12; see also C. FRIEDRICH, supra note 70, at 78 
(while the United States has always "been insistent that a declaration of human rights is 
not worth the paper it is written on unless ... accompanied by suitable provisions for 
their enforcement ... , the grandiloquent declarations of the French revolutionaries went 
by the board precisely because they were j!lst declarations."). See generally Fratcher, The 
Independence of the Judiciary Under the Constitution of 1787, 53 Mo. L. REV. 1 (1988). 
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ident Lincoln's objection during the Civil War,223 and the Su-
preme Court's truckling to military hysteria on the Japanese-
American internment question during another war less than a 
half century ago,224 it is considerably uncertain whether any ju-
diciary, fully independent or not, could have saved France from 
near anarchy. It is, after all, the executive branch which must 
execute the judgments of the judiciary. 
Moreover, the French people were then engaged in an Olym-
pian struggle of "overwhelming suddenness"225 to break chains 
of political repression which had been forged over the course of 
a thousand-year monarchy. Protection of civil rights is an act of 
governmental maturity and willingness to embrace the ideal of 
the rule of law, as is well evident to anyone who looks around 
the world today. It may be too harsh a judgment to now fault the 
revolutionary leaders of two centuries ago for failing to exhibit 
the maturity which many long established nations presently ap-
pear to lack. 
To focus on the Terror to the neglect of the Declaration of 
Rights itself would also be to obscure the importance of publicly 
articulating basic civil rights. The Declaration of Rights had dared 
to proclaim in ringing terms what few documents had ever before 
stated. In so doing, the Declaration of Rights bore witness to what 
much of the world now recognizes as self-evident, inalienable, 
basic civil rights. The Declaration of Rights raised the sights of 
countless thousands, in France and elsewhere, toward the pros-
pect of a better, more decent way of life. While it may be true 
that today "bills of rights are a dime a dozen,"226 that was not 
true in 1789. As the French revolutionaries well recognized, any 
sincere effort to protect civil rights must begin with their articu-
223 See generally w. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT: How IT WAS, How IT Is 147-49 
(1987) (discussing Ex Parte Merryman, 17 Fed. Cas. 144, (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487 ); 
Spector, Lincoln and Taney: A Study in Constitutional Polarization, 15 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 
199,204-05 (1971); see also J. RANDALL, CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS UNDER LINCOLN 118-
39 (1926) (discussing power to suspend habeas corpus). 
224 See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), discussed in J. JOSEPH, BLACK 
MONDAYS: WORST DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT 163-82 (1987). 
225 A. MATHIEZ, supra note 5, at 3. See also A. LOOMIS, supra note 16, at 12 ("Paris was 
a 'storm-tossed sea ... .' One after another, various men or parties emerged to seize 
power. One after another, they were swept away by forces stronger than themselves."); 
Kirkwood, Consolidation of Power and the Napoleonic Codes, 18 VAL. U.L. REv. 665, 669 
(1984) ("The Revolution ... took France, and ultimately the Continent and the world, 
by storm. It swept with an unexpected fury."). 
226 Rehnquist Address, supra note 89, at 7 (attributing view to Justice Antonin Scalia). 
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lation-that quintessentially human act of daring to say that they 
exist and are important. 
Although at times the promises of the Declaration of Rights 
have proved hollow in France, the liberal doctrines and guiding 
principles of the French Revolution have generally prevailed in 
that country over the past 200 years.227 Concern for the rights of 
the individual has been embraced regularly by the French courts, 
as some have argued was evidenced at the turn of this century in 
the celebrated case of Captain Alfred Dreyfus.228 After being 
court-martialled and imprisoned for betrayal of military secrets, 
Dreyfus was retried, pardoned, reinstated, and decorated with 
honors.229 "In the political struggle over Dreyfus, a majority of 
the French public eventually responded to appeals for truth, 
liberty, andjustice,"23o and as Professor J.F. Bosher of York Uni-
versity concludes, the outcome in that case vindicated the prin-
ciples of the Declaration of the Rights of Man. 231 
In the end, the French Revolution, ranging from the zenith of 
the Declaration of Rights to the nadir of the Terror, remains 
difficult to judge. What is clear, however, is that the Declaration 
of Rights remains "[o]ne of the classic statements of liberal think-
ing,"232 one of the great human rights charters in Western his-
tory.233 The concerns it addresses are timeless, and the spirit of 
its provisions is as commanding today as when they were first set 
down on paper. The Declaration of Rights has served as a model 
227 As Professor J.F. Bosher recently wrote on the eve of the French Bicentennial: 
[The] guarantees for the citizen have been substantial, in spite of the miscarriages 
of justice that might be found in the history of the last two centuries. Public 
guarantees have not protected every citizen against private vengeance, mob 
violence, police brutality, political spite, or terrorism, but they have maintained 
a good measure of safety for the individual in normal times. French streets in 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries have been decidedly freer from robbers, 
footpads, and murderous gangs than have American streets. 
J. BOSHER, supra note 4, at 272. 
[T]he National Constituent Assembly of 1789 established principles and a tra-
dition, even though its own constitution was short lived. Upon that heritage the 
nation may not maintain a regime for long, but it will "reconstitute" itself (se 
constituer) by due process now two centuries old. The liberal doctrines of the 
Revolution have been preserved and implemented in this way. 
[d. See also W. ANDREWS, CONSTITUTIONS AND CONSTITUTIONALISM 67 (3d ed. 1968). 
228 J. BOSHER, supra note 4, at 272-73. See generally Katz, The Trials of Captain Alfred 
Dreyfus, 51 CAL. ST. B.J. 12 (1976). 
229 See J. BOSHER, supra note 4, at 272. 
250 [d. at 272-73. 
2Sl Id. at 273. 
1St Id. at 137. 
ISS See BLAUSTEIN & SIGLER, supra note 43, at 81. 
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for similar bills of rights contained in constitutions of other coun-
tries throughout Europe and around the world.234 Indeed, several 
nations, including France and former French dependencies,235 
continue to expressly affirm their support of its ideals. In reflect-
ing on the Declaration of Rights' origin and content on the oc-
casion of the French bicentennial, we pay tribute to the struggles 
of the great nation and, as Franklin and Jefferson might remind 
us, we also honor a small part of our own history as well. 
234 See G. JELLINEK, supra note 9, at 4. 
235 See Spitzer, France, in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD, (A. Blaustein 
& G. Flanz eds. 1988) (French Constitution of 1958); A. BLAUSTEIN, supra note 42, at 10 
(Senegal Constitution of 1963, Mali Constitution of 1974, and Central African Republic 
Constitution of 1981). 
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APPENDIX 
The French Declaration of 1789 with Annotations to the Early 
American State Constitutions l 
The Declaration of the Rights of Man and of Citizens2 
35 
The representatives of the people of France, formed into a National 
Assembly, considering that ignorance, neglect, or contempt of human 
rights, are the sole causes of public misfortunes and corruptions of 
Government, have resolved to set forth in a solemn declaration, these 
natural, imprescriptible, and inalienable rights; that this declaration 
being constantly present to the minds of the members body social, they 
may be ever kept attentive to their rights and their duties;3 that the acts 
of the legislative and executive powers of Government, being capable 
of being every moment compared with the end of political institutions, 
may be more respected; and also, that the future claims of the citizens, 
being directed by simple and incontestable principles, may always tend 
to the maintenance of the Constitution, and the general happiness.4 
For these reasons the National Assembly doth recognise [sic] and 
declare, in the presence of the Supreme Being, and with a hope of his 
blessing and favour, the following sacred rights of men and of citizens: 
I. Men are born, and always continue, free and equal in respect of 
their rights.s Civil distinctions, therefore, can only be founded on public 
utility. 
II. The end of all political associations is the preservation of the 
natural and imprescriptible rights of man; and these rights are Liberty, 
Property, Security, and Resistance of Oppression.6 
III. The Nation is essentially the source of all sovereignty;7 nor can 
any individual or any body of men, be entitled to any authority which 
is not expressly derived from it. 
IV. Political Liberty consists in the power of doing whatever does not 
injure another. The exercise of the natural rights of every man, has no 
other limits than those which are necessary to secure to every other man 
the free exercise of the same rights; and these limits are determinable 
only by the law. 
V. The law ought to prohibit only actions hurtful to society. What is 
not prohibited by the law, should not be hindered; nor should anyone 
be compelled to that which the law does not require. 
VI. The law is an expression of the will of the community. All citizens 
have a right to concur, either personally or by their representatives, in 
its formation.s It should be the same to all, whether it protects or 
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punishes;9 and all being equal in its sight, are equally eligible to all 
honors, places, and employments, according to their different abilities, 
without any other distinction than that created by their virtues and 
talents. \0 
VII. No man should be accused, arrested, or held in confinement, 
except in cases determined by the law, and according to the forms which 
it has prescribed. I I All who promote, solicit, execute, or cause to be 
executed, arbitrary orders, ought to be punished,12 and every citizen 
called upon, or apprehended by virtue of the law, ought immediately 
to obey, and renders himself culpable by resistance. 
VIII. The law ought to impose no other penalties but such as are 
absolutely and evidently necessary; 13 and no one ought to be punished, 
but in virtue of a law promulgated before the offense, and legally 
applied. 14 
IX. Every man being presumed innocent till he has been convicted, 
whenever his detention becomes indispensable, all rigor to him, more 
than is necessary to secure his person, ought to be provided against by 
the law. ls 
X. No man ought to be molested on account of his opinions, not even 
on account of his religious opinions,16 provided his avowal of them does 
not disturb the public order established by law. 17 
XI. The unrestrained communication of thoughts and opinions being 
one of the most precious Rights of Man, every citizen may speak,18 
write,19 and publish20 freely, provided he is responsible for the abuse 
of this liberty, in cases determined by the law. 
XII. A public force being necessary to give security to the Rights of 
Men and of citizens, that force is instituted for the benefit of the com-
munity and not for the particular benefit of the persons with whom it 
is entrusted. 21 
XIII. A common contribution being necessary for the support of the 
public force, and for defraying the other expenses of Government, it 
ought to be divided equally among the members of the community, 
according to their abilities.22 
XIV. Every citizen has a right, either by himself or his representative, 
to a free voice in determining the necessity of public contributions, the 
appropriation of them, and their amount, mode of assessment, and 
duration. 23 
XV. Every community has a right to demand of all its agents, an 
account of their conduct. 24 
XVI. Every community)n which a separation of powers and a security 
of rights is not provided for, wants a Constitution.25 
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XVII. The rights to property being inviolable and sacred, no one 
ought to be deprived of it, except in cases of evident public necessity, 
legally ascertained,26 and on condition of a previous just indemnity.27 
ANNOTATIONS 
1. For citations suggesting parallels between the French Declaration of the 
Rights of Man and of Citizens (Declaration of Rights) and the American Con-
stitution and Bill of Rights, see supra notes 22-34. 
2. This translation is taken from T. PAINE, THE RIGHTS OF MAN 94-97 (1951) 
(reprint). The state constitutions cited infra in notes 3-27 may be found in THE 
FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC 
LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES (P. Poore, ed., 2d ed. 1878). 
3. For language similarly suggesting the importance of continued public 
attention to declared rights and duties, see N.C. CONST. art. XXI (1776) ("a 
frequent recurrence to fundamental principles is absolutely necessary, to pre-
serve the blessings of liberty"); VA. BILL OF RIGHTS § 15 (1776) ("no free 
government, or the blessings of liberty, can be preserved to any people, but by 
... frequent recurrence to fundamental principles"). 
4. The stated goal of maintaining the "general happiness" parallels American 
references to advancing the "general" or "common" good. See MASS. CONST. 
part I, art. VII (1780) ("Government is instituted for the common good"); N.H. 
CONST. art. I (1784) ("all government ... is ... instituted for the general good"); 
PA. CONST. art. V (1776) ("government is, or ought to be, instituted for the 
common benefit, protection and security of the people"). 
5. Strongly similar language may be found in: N.H. CONST. art. I (1784) ("All 
men are born equally free and independent"); MASS. CONST. part 1, art. I (1780) 
("All men are born free and equal, and have certain natural, essential, and 
unalienable rights"); PA. CONST. art. I (1776) ("all men are born equally free 
and independent"); VT. CONST. ch. I, art. I (1777) ("all men are born equally 
free and independent"); VA. BILL OF RIGHTS § 1 (1776) ("all men are by their 
nature equally free and independent"). 
6. Very similar language may be found in: MASS. CONST., preamble (1780) 
("The end of the institution, maintenance, and administration of government 
is to ... furnish the individuals who compose it with the power of enjoying, in 
safety and tranquility, their natural rights and the blessings of life"), part 1, 
art. 1 ("All men ... have ... the right of enjoying and defending their lives 
and liberties; ... of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property; ... of 
seeking and obtaining their safety and happiness"); N.H. CONST. art. II (1784) 
("All men have certain natural, essential, and inherent rights; among which 
are-the enjoying and defending life and liberty-acquiring, possessing and 
protecting property-and in a word, of seeking and obtaining happiness"); PA. 
CONST. preamble (1776) ("all government ought to ... enable the individuals 
who compose it to enjoy their natural rights"), art. I ("all men ... have certain 
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natural, inherent and unalienable rights, amongst which are, the enjoying and 
defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and 
pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety"); VT. CONST. ch. I, art. I (1777) 
("all men ... have certain natural, inherent and unalienable rights, amongst 
which are the enjoying and defending life and liberty; acquiring, possessing 
and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety"); 
V A. BILL OF RIGHTS § 1 (1776) ("all men ... have certain inherent rights, ... 
namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and 
possessing property, and pursuing happiness and safety"). 
7. The same idea is conveyed by language contained in American constitu-
tions stating that all power is vested, or resides, in the people; that all govern-
ment originates from the people; or that the people have the sole right of 
governing themselves. See CONN. CONST. preamble (1776) ("The People of this 
State ... have the sole and exclusive Right of governing themselves"); MD. 
CONST. § I (1776) ("all government of right originates from the people"); MASS. 
CONST. part 1, art. V (1780) ("All power [resides) originally in the people"); 
N.H. CONST. art. I (1784) ("all government of right originates from the people"); 
N.C. CONST. art. 1 (1776) ("all political power is vested in and derived from the 
people only"); PA. CONST. preamble (1776) ("government ... [properly is) 
derived from and founded on the authority of the people only"), art. IV ("all 
power ... [is] originally inherent in, and consequently derived from, the 
people"); VT. CONST. ch. I, art. V (1777) ("all power ... [is] originally inherent 
in, and consequently, derived from, the people"); VA. BILL OF RIGHTS § 2 (1776) 
("all power is vested in, and consequently derived from, the people"). 
8. Substantially similar language may be found in MASS. CON ST. part 1, art. 
X (1780) ("the people ... are not controllable by any other laws than those to 
which their constitutional representative body have given their consent"). See 
also N.H. CONST. art. XII (1784) ("the inhabitants of this state [are not] con-
trollable by any other laws than those to which they or their representative body 
have given their consent"); VT. CONST. ch. I, art. 1860 (1777) ("the people [are 
not] bound by any law, but such as they have, in like manner, assented to, for 
their common good"); N.Y. CONST. art. I (1777) ("no authority shall ... be 
exercised over the people ... but such as shall be derived from and granted 
by them"). 
The same idea-that persons have the right to participate in the formation 
of laws-is conveyed by provisions in American state constitutions providing 
for the popular election of representatives empowered to make laws. See GA. 
CONST. art. I, §§ 2, 6, 16, art. IV, §§ 1-2 (1789) (decreeing popular election of 
the state senate and house of representatives and conferring on those bodies 
the "power to make all laws and ordinances"); VA. BILL OF RIGHTS § 5 (1776) 
(legislative and executive vacancies should be filled "by frequent, certain, and 
regular elections"), § 6 ("all men ... have the right of suffrage, and cannot 
... , without their own consent, or that of their representatives ... , [be) ... 
bound by any law to which they have not ... assented"); see also MD. CONST. 
Declaration of Rights § V (1776) ("the right in the people to participate in the 
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Legislature, is the best security of liberty ... ; for this purpose, elections ought 
to be free and frequent, and every man, having property in, a common interest 
with, and an attachment to the community, ought to have a right of suffrage"). 
9. For expressions likewise embodying the concept of equal protection of the 
laws, see MASS. CONST. preamble (1780) (endorsing "impartial interpretation" 
of the laws); N.H. CONST. art. XXXV (1784) ("there [must] be an impartial 
interpretation of the laws, and administration of justice"); N.J. CONST. art. XVI 
(1776) ("all criminals shall be admitted to the same privileges of witnesses and 
counsel, as their prosecutors are or shall be entitled to"); PA. CONST. § 26 (1776) 
('justice shall be impartially administered"). 
10. The cited phrase in the Declaration of Rights refers to the revolutionary 
goal of ending special privileges for the clergy and nobility, who prior to the 
revolution enjoyed preferential treatment in France. The same idea-that talent, 
ability, and application, rather than matters unrelated thereto, should determine 
one's place in society-is found in various provisions in American state consti-
tutions, including those which abolish or place special burdens on titles of 
nobility, prohibit public offices from being hereditary, or state that one's privi-
leges are determined solely by one's public service. See GA. CON ST. art. XI (1777) 
(no "person who holds any title of nobility [shall] be entitled to a vote, or be 
capable of serving as a representative"); MD. CONST. Declaration of Rights § XL 
(1776) ("no title of nobility, or hereditary honours, ought to be granted in this 
State"); MASS. CONST. part 1, art. VI (1780) ("No ... men have any other title 
to obtain advantages, or particular and exclusive privileges distinct from those 
of the community, than what rises from the consideration of services rendered 
to the public, and this title being neither hereditary nor transmissible"); N.H. 
CONST. art. IX (1784) ("No office or place whatsoever in government, shall be 
hereditary-the abilities and integrity requisite in all, not being transmissible to 
posterity or relations."); N.C. CONST. art. III (1776) ("no man or set of men are 
entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the community, 
but in consideration of public services"), art. XXII ("no hereditary emoluments, 
privileges or honors ought to be granted or conferred in this State"); VT. CONST. 
ch. I, art. VI (1777) ("government is ... instituted for the common benefit, 
protection, and security of the people ... ; not for the particular emolument 
or advantage of any single man, family or set of men"); VA. BILL OF RIGHTS § 4 
(1776) ("no man, or set of men, are entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments 
or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services"). 
II. Compare CONN. CONST. para. 2 (1776) ("No Man's Person shall be arrested 
... unless clearly warranted by the Laws of this State"), para. 4 ("no Man's 
Person shall be restrained, or imprisoned, by any authority whatsoever, before 
the Law hath sentenced him thereunto, ... unless ... some express Law doth 
allow"); MD. CONST. Declaration of Rights § XXI (1776) ("no freeman ought to 
be taken, or imprisoned, or disseized of his freehold, liberties, or privileges, or 
outlawed, or exiled ... but by the judgment of his peers, or by the law of the 
land"); MASS. CONST. part I, art. XII (1780) ("no subject shall be arrested, 
imprisoned, despoiled, or deprived of his property, immunities or privileges, 
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... but by the judgment of his peers, or the law of the land"); N.H. CONST. art. 
XV (1784) ("no subject shall be arrested, imprisoned, despoiled or deprived of 
his property ... , but by the judgment of his peers or the law of the land"), 
art. XIX ("no warrant ought to be issued but in case, and with the formalities 
prescribed by the laws"); N.Y. CONST. art. XIII (1777) ("no member of this State 
shall be disenfranchised, or deprived of any ... rights and privileges ... , 
unless by the law of the land, or the judgment of his peers"); N.C. CONST. art. 
XII (1776) ("no freeman ought to be taken, imprisoned, or disseized of his 
freehold, liberties or privileges, or outlawed, or exiled ... but by the law of the 
land"); PA. CONST. art. IX (1776) ("nor can any man be justly deprived of his 
liberty except by the laws of the land, or the judgment of his peers"); VT. CONST. 
ch. I, art. X (1777) (no man may "be justly deprived of his liberty, except by 
the laws of the land or the judgment of his peers"); VA. BILL OF RIGHTS § 8 
(1776) ("no man [may 1 be deprived of his liberty, except by the law of the land"). 
Unlike the Declaration of Rights, many of the American state constitutions 
specifically endorsed the right to trial by jury and extensively detailed the rights 
of the accused. See, e.g., VT. CONST. ch. I, art. X (1777) (discussing rights of 
accused and trial by jury). The American charters also tended to include exten-
sive discussions of search warrants, which are not mentioned in the French 
document. See, e.g., N.C. CONST. art. XI (1776) ("general warrants ... ought 
not to be granted"); PA. CONST. art. X (1776) ("warrants without oaths or 
affirmations first made, affording a sufficient foundation for them ... ought 
not to be granted"); VA. BILL OF RIGHTS § 10 (1776) (condemning search 
warrants lacking specificity). 
12. Perhaps the closest parallel to this provision in the Declaration of Rights 
calling for the punishment of those who engage in arbitrary action is language 
in the Pennsylvania constitution indicating that public officers may be "reduced" 
to a "private station" to curb oppressive practices. See PA. CONST. art. VI (1776) 
("That those who are employed in the legislative and executive business of the 
State, may be restrained from oppression, the people have a right, at such 
periods as they may think proper, to reduce their public officers to a private 
station, and supply the vacancies by certain and regular elections"). 
13. The French prohibition of unnecessary penalties echoes American state 
constitutional provisions condemning excessive fines or bailor cruel and unusual 
punishment, or directing that a penal sanction should be proportionate to the 
offense. See GA. CONST. art. LIX (1777) ("Excessive fines shall not be levied, nor 
excessive bail demanded"); MD. CONST. Declaration of Rights § XIV (1776) 
("sanguinary laws ought to be avoided ... and no law, to inflict cruel and 
unusual pains and penalties, ought to be made"), § XXII ("excessive bail ought 
not to be required, nor excessive fines imposed"); MA. CONST. part 1, art. XXVI 
(1780) ("No magistrate or court of law shall demand excessive bailor sureties, 
impose excessive fines, or inflict cruel or unusual punishments"); N.H. CON ST. 
art. XVIII (1784) ("All penalties ought to be proportioned to the nature of the 
offense"), art. XXXIII ("No magistrate or court of law shall demand excessive 
bailor sureties, impose excessive fines, or inflict cruel or unusual punishments"); 
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N.C. CONST. art. X (1776) ("excessive bail should not be required, nor excessive 
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted"); PA. CONST. § 38 
(1776) ("punishments [should be] made ... proportionate to the crimes") 
(brackets added); S.C. CONST. § XL (1778) (providing that "the penal laws ... 
shall be ... in general proportionate to the offense"); VA. BILL OF RIGHTS § 9 
(1776) ("excessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive fines imposed"; 
"cruel and unusual punishments [ought not to be] inflicted") (brackets added). 
14. Corresponding ex post facto law prohibitions are found in: MD. CONST. 
Declaration of Rights § XV (1776) ("no ex post facto law ought to be made") 
(italics in original); MASS. CONST. part 1, art. XXIV (1780) ("Laws made to 
punish for actions done before the existence of such laws ... are unjust"); N.H. 
CONST. art. XXIII (1784) ("Retrospective laws are highly injurious, oppressive 
and unjust. No such laws, therefore, should be made, either for the decision of 
civil causes, or the punishment of offences"); N.C. CON ST. art. XXIV (1776) 
("no ex post facto law ought to be made") (italics in original). 
15. See supra note 13 (noting state constitutions prohibiting cruel and unusual 
punishment). 
16. Topics relating to religion were extensively treated in the early American 
state constitutions, and the treatment often differed substantially from state to 
state. Language paralleling the French guarantee of a right to hold religious 
opinions may be found in: GA. CONST. art. IV, § 5 (1789) ("All persons shall 
have the free exercise of religion"); N.]. CONST. art. XVIII (1776) ("no person 
shall ever ... be deprived of the inestimable privilege of worshipping Almighty 
God in a manner agreeable to the dictates of his own conscience"); N. Y. CONST. 
art. XXXVIII (1777) ("the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession 
and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever hereafter be 
allowed"); N.C. CONST. art. XIX (1776) ("all men have a natural and unalienable 
right to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own con-
sciences"); PA. CONST. art. II (1776) ("all men have a natural right to worship 
Almighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences and under-
standing ... And ... no authority can or ought to ... interfere with ... the 
free exercise of religious worship"); VA. BILL OF RIGHTS § 16 (1776) ("all men 
are equally entitled to the free exercise of religion ... , and it is the mutual 
duty of all to practise Christian forebearance ... towards each other"). See also 
DEL. CONST. art. 29 (1776) ("There shall be no establishment of anyone religious 
sect ... in preference to another"). 
However, not all states were equally tolerant of all religions. Thus, South 
Carolina's constitution provided that only those "persons and religious societies 
who acknowledge that there is one God, and a future state of rewards and 
punishments, and that God is publicly to be worshipped, shall be freely toler-
ated." S.C. CONST. § XXXVIII (1778). The same document further designated 
the "Christian Protestant religion" as the "established religion" of the state, and 
defined conditions for the formation of churches, the hiring of ministers, and 
the conduct of religious assemblies. [d. See also N.H. CON ST. part II (1784) 
(providing that senators, representatives, and state presidents had to be of the 
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Protestant religion); PA. CONST. § 10 (1776) (providing that members of the 
state house of representatives had to take an oath which stated in part: "I do 
acknowledge the Scriptures of the Old Testament and New Testament to be 
given by Divine inspiration."); VT. CONST. ch. II, § IX (1777) (similar language). 
North Carolina was evidently ambivalent on the issue of religious freedom. 
While providing in its "Form of Government" that "all persons shall be at liberty 
to exercise their own mode of worship," it burdened that liberty by providing 
that "no person, who shall deny the ... truth of the Protestant religion ... 
shall be capable of holding any office or place of trust or profit in the civil 
department [of the] State." N.C. CONST. Form of Government arts. XXXII and 
XXXIV (1776). 
Similarly, while Vermont's constitution provided that "no authority can ... 
interfere with, or in any manner controul [sic], the rights of conscience, in the 
free exercise of religious worship," it expressed a preference for one sect, stating 
that "any man who professes the protestant religion, [cannot] be justly deprived 
or abridged of any civil right ... on account of his religious sentiment," and 
further opined that "every sect or denomination ought to observe the Sabbath." 
VT. CONST. ch. I, art. III (1777). 
17. The proviso in the Declaration of Rights conditioning the right to reli-
gious opinion on nondisturbance of the public order finds parallels in several 
American state constitutions. See GA. CONST. art. LVI (1777) ("All persons 
whatever shall have the free exercise of their religion; provided it be not 
repugnant to the peace and safety of the State .... "); MASS. CONST. part 1, art. 
II (1780) ("no subject shall be hurt, molested, or restrained, in his person, 
liberty, or estate, for worshipping God in the manner and season most agreeable 
to the dictates of his own conscience, or for his religious profession or senti-
ments, provided he doth not disturb the public peace or obstruct others in the 
religious worship"); N.H. CONST. art. V (1784) ("no subject shall be hurt, mo-
lested, or restrained in his person, liberty or estate for worshipping GOD, in 
the manner and season most agreeable to the dictates of his own conscience ... 
provided he doth not disturb the public peace, or disturb others, in their 
religious worship") (caps in original). 
Maryland's constitution of 1776 protected the religious liberty only of those 
persons "professing the Christian religion," and even those persons were en-
joined from "disturb[ing] the good order, peace or safety of the State, or ... 
[infringing] the laws of morality, or [injuring] others." MD. CONST. Declaration 
of Rights § XXXIII (1776). 
18. Compare PA. CONST. art. XII (1776) ("the people have a right to freedom 
of speech"); VT. CONST. ch. I, art. XIV (1777). 
19. Compare PA. CONST. art. XII (1776) ("the people have a right to freedom 
... of writing"); VT. CONST. ch. I, art. XIV (1777). 
20. Equivalent language is found in many of the American constitutions. See 
GA. CONST. art. LXI (1777) ("Freedom of the press and trial by jury [are] to 
remain inviolate forever."); GA. CONST. art. IV, § 3 (1789) ("Freedom of the 
press and trial by jury shall remain inviolate."); MD. CONST. Declaration of 
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Rights § XXXVIII (1776) ("the liberty of the press ought to be inviolably 
preserved"); MAss. CaNST. part I, art. XVI (1780) ("liberty of the press is 
essential to the security of freedom in a State; it ought not, therefore, to be 
restrained"); N.H. CaNsT. art. XXII (1784) ("The Liberty of the Press is essential 
to the security of freedom in a state; it ought, therefore, to be inviolably 
preserved."); N.C. CaNsT. art. XV (1776) ("freedom of the press ... ought 
never to be restrained"); PA. CaNsT. art. XII (1776) ("the people have a right 
to freedom of ... publishing their sentiments; therefore the freedom of the 
press ought not to be restrained"); S.C. CaNsT. § XLIII (1778) ("the liberty of 
the press [shall] be inviolably preserved"); VT. CONST. ch. I, art. XIV (1777) 
(freedom to publish); VA. BILL aF RIGHTS § 12 (1776) ("freedom af the press 
... can never be restrained"). 
21. The Declaration af Rights' recognition of the importance of police or 
military forces and of the fact that they do not exist for their own benefit is 
echoed in VA. BILL OF RIGHTS § 13 (1776) ("a well-regulated militia ... is the 
proper, natural, and safe defence of a free State; ... and ... in all cases the 
military should be under strict subordination to, and governed by, the civil 
power"). See also MD. CONST. Declaration of Rights § II (1776) (the "State ought 
to have the sole and exclusive right of regulating the internal government and 
police thereof"), § XXV ("a well-regulated militia is the proper and natural 
defence of a free government"), § XXVII ("the military ought to be under strict 
subordination to and control of the civil power"); N.H. CaNsT. art. XXVI (1784) 
("the military ought to be under strict subordination to, and governed by the 
civil power"); N.C. CaNsT. Declaration of Rights art. XVII (1776) ("the military 
should be kept under strict subordination to, and governed by the civil power"); 
PA. CaNsT. art. XIII (1776) ("the military should be kept under strict subordi-
nation to, and governed by, the civil power"); S.c. CaNsT. § XLII (1778) (pro-
viding that "the military [shall] be subordinate to the civil power of the State"); 
VT. CaNsT. ch. I, art. IV ("the people ... have the sole ... right of governing 
and regulating the internal police" of the state), art. XV (1777) ("the military 
should be kept under strict subordination to, and governed by, the civil power"). 
22. See N.H. CaNsT. part I, art. XII (1784) ("Every member ofthe community 
has a right to be protected by it in the enjoyment of his life, liberty and property; 
he is therefore bound to contribute his share in the expense of such protection 
.... "); PA. CaNST. art. VIII (1776) ("every member of society hath a right to 
be protected ... and therefore is bound to contribute his proportion towards 
the expense of that protection"); VT. CON ST. ch. I, art. IX (1777) ("every 
member of society hath a right to be protected ... and therefore, is bound to 
contribute his proportion towards the expense of that protection"). 
Other state constitutions, through provisions not directly dealing with the 
subsidization of public protection, embraced the idea that there is a civic obli-
gation to pay taxes and that a tax burden imposed on an individual should be 
proportional to his ability to pay. See MD. CONST. Declaration of Rights § XIII 
(1776) (except paupers, "every ... person in the State ought to contribute his 
proportion of public taxes, for the support of government, according to his 
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actual worth"); MASS. CONST. part I, art. X (1780) ("Each individual ... is 
obliged ... to contribute his share to the expense of ... protection"). 
23. This article-providing in effect that there should be no taxation without 
representation-has counterparts in a number of state constitutions. See MD. 
CONST. Declaration of Rights § XII (1776) ("no ... tax ... ought to be ... 
levied ... without the consent of the Legislature"); MASS. CONST. part I, art. 
XXIII (1780) ("No subsidy, charge, tax, impost, or duties, ought to be estab-
lished, fixed, laid, or levied ... without the consent of the people, or their 
representatives"), art. X ("no part of the property of any individual can, with 
justice, be taken from him, or applied to public uses, without his own consent, 
or that of the representative body of the people"); N.H. CONST. art. XXVIII 
(1784) ("No subsidy, charge, tax, impost or duty shall be established ... without 
the consent of the people or their representatives"); N.C. CONST. Declaration 
of Rights art. XVI (1776) ("the people of this State ought not to be taxed, or 
made subject to any ... impost or duty, without the consent of themselves, or 
their Representatives in General Assembly, freely given"); VT. CONST. ch. II, 
§ XXXVII (1777) ("No public tax ... shall be imposed upon ... the people of 
this State, except by a law for that purpose" passed by the legislature); VA. BILL 
OF RIGHTS § 6 (1776) ("all men ... have the right of suffrage, and cannot be 
taxed or deprived of their property for public uses, without their own consent, 
or that of their representatives so elected"). 
24. The theme that public agents should be accountable was sounded in 
many of the American state constitutions. See GA. CONST. art. XLIX (1777) 
("Every officer of the State shall be liable to be called to account by the house 
of assembly"); MD. CONST. Declaration of Rights § IV (1776) ("all persons 
invested with the legislative or executive powers of government are the trustees 
of the public, and, as such, accountable for their conduct"); MASS. CONST. part 
I, art. V (1780) ("magistrates and officers of government ... are at all times 
accountable" to the people"), art. XVIII (the people "have a right to require of 
their lawgivers and magistrates an exact and constant observance" of the fun-
damental principles of the constitution); N.H. CONST. art. VIII (1784) ("all 
power residing originally in, and being derived from the people, all the mag-
istrates and officers of government, are their substitutes and agents, and at all 
times accountable to them'); PA. CONST. art. IV (1776) ("all officers of govern-
ment, whether legislative or executive, are ... accountable to" the people); VT. 
CONST. ch. I, art. V (1777) ("all officers of government ... [are] accountable 
to" the people); VA. BILL OF RIGHTS § 2 (1776) ("magistrates are [the people's] 
trustees and servants, and at all times amenable to them"). 
25. The concept of separation of powers was also basic in the early American 
state constitutions. See GA. CONST. art. I (1777) ("The legislative, executive, and 
judiciary departments shall be separate and distinct"); MD. CONST. Declaration 
of Rights § VI (1776) ("the legislative, executive and judicial powers of govern-
ment, ought to be forever separate and distinct"); MASS. CONST. part 1, art. 
XXX (1780) (providing for separation of powers); N.H. CONST. art. XXXVII 
(1784) ("the three essential powers ... , the legislative, executive and judicial, 
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ought to be kept as separate from and independent of each other, as the nature 
of a free government will admit"); N.C. CONST. art. IV (1776) ("the legislative, 
executive, and supreme judicial powers of government, ought to be forever 
separate and distinct from each other"); VA. BILL OF RIGHTS § 5 (1776) ("the 
legislative and executive powers of the State should be separate and distinct 
from the judiciary"). 
26. Provisions barring unlawful takings of private property may be found in: 
N.H. CONST. art. XII (1784) ("no part of a man's property shall be taken from 
him, or applied to public uses, without his own consent, or that of the repre-
sentative body of the people"); PA. CONST. art. VIII (1776) ("no part of a man's 
property can be justly taken from him, or applied to public uses, without his 
own consent, or that of his legal representatives"); VT. CON ST. ch. I, art. IX 
(1777) ("no part of a man's property can be justly taken from him, and applied 
to public uses, without his own consent, or that of his legal representatives"). 
27. A few of the early state constitutions recognized the right to compensation 
for property taken by the state, but, unlike the Declaration of Rights, they did 
not require that the compensation be paid prior to the taking. See MASS. CONST. 
part 1, art. X (1780) ("whenever the public exigencies require that the property 
of any individual should be appropriated to public uses, he shall receive a 
reasonable compensation therefore"); VT. CONST. ch. I, art. II (1777) ("when-
ever any particular man's property is taken for the use of the public, the owner 
ought to receive an equivalent in money"). 
